<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:breach="https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/xmlns/breach/1.0"><channel><title>Credential Theft</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/</link><description>Account takeover, phishing, and credential harvesting incidents</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><managingEditor>Breach Notes Project</managingEditor><lastBuildDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 16:08:17 +1100</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Handala Hacks FBI Director Kash Patel Personal Email — Iranian Intelligence Operation</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2026-03_handala-iran-fbi-director-kash-patel-email/</link><pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2026-03_handala-iran-fbi-director-kash-patel-email/</guid><description>In late March 2026, Handala — an Iranian state-linked hacktivist group that has previously conducted operations attributed to Iran&amp;#39;s IRGC — published photographs and alleged personal emails obtained from FBI Director Kash Patel&amp;#39;s personal email account. Handala posted the materials online as a …</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[In late March 2026, Handala — an Iranian state-linked hacktivist group that has previously conducted operations attributed to Iran&rsquo;s IRGC — published photographs and alleged personal emails obtained from FBI Director Kash Patel&rsquo;s personal email account. Handala posted the materials online as a demonstration of access to the FBI director&rsquo;s personal communications. Kash Patel was confirmed as FBI Director in February 2025 following his nomination by President Trump. The breach of a sitting FBI Director&rsquo;s personal email represents an extraordinarily sensitive national security incident, as the FBI Director has access to intelligence briefings, law enforcement sensitive information, and communications with senior US government officials. The use of a personal (non-government) email account for any official or semi-official communications creates a significant vulnerability exploitable by adversaries. Handala has been active since at least 2023 and has claimed credit for multiple cyberattacks against Israeli and US targets in conjunction with broader Iranian retaliatory activities. The FBI confirmed it was aware of the incident and investigating. The Department of Justice opened a criminal inquiry. Separately, US federal agents seized four web domains associated with Handala&rsquo;s Iranian online leak infrastructure in the days following the Patel email disclosure — part of broader US government action to disrupt Iranian cyber-enabled influence operations. The Handala group was also responsible for the March 2026 Stryker Medical wiper attack.]]></content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.databreachtoday.com/handala-hacks-fbi-director-kash-patels-personal-email-a-31244</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2026-03-25</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2026-03-27</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:initialAttackVector>Handala — an Iranian state-linked hacktivist group operating as a persona for Iran's IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) — obtained access to FBI Director Kash Patel's personal email account and/or cloud storage through unknown means, likely credential theft, SIM swapping, or exploitation of a third-party service</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>FBI Director Kash Patel personal email account</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>Libyan Oil Refinery Multi-Month Cyberespionage Campaign</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2026-03_multi-month-cyberespionage-campaign-hits-libyan-oil-refinery/</link><pubDate>Fri, 20 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2026-03_multi-month-cyberespionage-campaign-hits-libyan-oil-refinery/</guid><description>A multi-month cyberespionage campaign targeted a Libyan oil refinery in 2026, using commodity (commercially&#10;available) malware to maintain persistent covert access for intelligence collection. Oil and gas critical&#10;infrastructure in politically unstable regions like Libya represents high-value …</description><content:encoded>A multi-month cyberespionage campaign targeted a Libyan oil refinery in 2026, using commodity (commercially
available) malware to maintain persistent covert access for intelligence collection. Oil and gas critical
infrastructure in politically unstable regions like Libya represents high-value targets for state-sponsored
espionage actors seeking intelligence on energy production capacity, export volumes, financial transactions,
and operational vulnerabilities. The use of commodity malware (rather than custom tools) suggests either a
nation-state actor using commercial tools for deniability, or a sophisticated criminal group with geopolitical
clients. The campaign was detected and disclosed by cybersecurity researchers. Libyan oil infrastructure is
controlled by the National Oil Corporation (NOC) and is a focal point of geopolitical competition between
multiple regional actors.</content:encoded><category>other</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.databreachtoday.com/multi-month-cyberespionage-campaign-hits-libyan-oil-refinery-a-31091</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2026-03-20</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2026-03-20</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:initialAttackVector>A suspected cyberespionage campaign targeted a Libyan oil refinery using commodity malware, maintaining persistent access over multiple months for industrial intelligence collection</breach:initialAttackVector></item><item><title>Starbucks Partner Central Phishing Breach - 889 Employees</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2026-01_starbucks-partner-central-phishing/</link><pubDate>Mon, 19 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2026-01_starbucks-partner-central-phishing/</guid><description>Between January 19 and February 11, 2026, attackers used phishing pages cloning the Starbucks Partner Central portal to steal employee credentials. Starbucks detected the unauthorized access on February 6, 2026. Approximately 889 employees were affected. Compromised data includes names, Social …</description><content:encoded>Between January 19 and February 11, 2026, attackers used phishing pages cloning the Starbucks Partner Central portal to steal employee credentials. Starbucks detected the unauthorized access on February 6, 2026. Approximately 889 employees were affected. Compromised data includes names, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and bank account and routing numbers. Starbucks launched an investigation, notified law enforcement, and strengthened security controls for Partner Central accounts. Affected employees were offered 24 months of identity protection and restoration services through Experian IdentityWorks, including identity theft detection, recovery assistance, and $1 million in coverage.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/starbucks-discloses-data-breach-affecting-hundreds-of-employees/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2026-01-19</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2026-02-06</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2026-02-06</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Attackers used phishing — fake websites mimicking the Starbucks Partner Central employee portal — to steal employee login credentials, then used those credentials to access the portal and exfiltrate employee PII</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Starbucks Partner Central (employee HR/payroll portal)</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>Coinbase Insider Bribery Data Breach</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2025-05_coinbase-insider-bribery/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2025-05_coinbase-insider-bribery/</guid><description>Attackers bribed at least one overseas customer support agent contracted through third-party vendor TaskUs to access and steal Coinbase customer data from internal support systems. Data stolen on approximately 69,461 customers included names, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, masked SSNs, …</description><content:encoded>Attackers bribed at least one overseas customer support agent contracted through third-party vendor TaskUs to access and steal Coinbase customer data from internal support systems. Data stolen on approximately 69,461 customers included names, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, masked SSNs, masked bank account numbers, government-issued ID images (KYC), and account balance snapshots. Attackers demanded a $20 million ransom; Coinbase refused and instead offered a $20 million reward for information leading to the attackers&amp;rsquo; arrest. Estimated total costs including remediation and customer reimbursements: up to $400 million. No passwords, private keys, or seed phrases were compromised. Multiple criminal investigations opened. Highlights risk of third-party vendor insider threats in high-value fintech operations.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.coinbase.com/blog/protecting-our-customers-standing-up-to-extortionists</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2025-01-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2025-05-15</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2025-05-15</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Insider threat: cybercriminals bribed overseas customer support contractors (via TaskUs vendor) to exfiltrate customer data from internal support tools</breach:initialAttackVector></item><item><title>Radiant Capital DeFi Hack</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2024-10_radiant-capital-defi-lazarus/</link><pubDate>Wed, 16 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2024-10_radiant-capital-defi-lazarus/</guid><description>On 16 October 2024, attackers executed transferOwnership on Radiant Capital&amp;#39;s Pool Provider contract using 3 collected malicious signatures, gaining control of all lending pool contracts on BSC and Arbitrum. $50 million drained. Initial compromise began 11 September 2024 via Telegram message to a …</description><content:encoded>On 16 October 2024, attackers executed transferOwnership on Radiant Capital&amp;rsquo;s Pool Provider contract using 3 collected malicious signatures, gaining control of all lending pool contracts on BSC and Arbitrum. $50 million drained. Initial compromise began 11 September 2024 via Telegram message to a developer. Mandiant attributed to UNC4736, a Lazarus Group sub-cluster aligned with North Korea&amp;rsquo;s Reconnaissance General Bureau.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://cointelegraph.com/news/radiant-capital-north-korean-impersonated-ex-contractor-50-million-hack</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2024-10-16</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2024-10-16</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2024-10-17</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>North Korean UNC4736 (Citrine Sleet/Lazarus sub-group) delivered InletDrift malware via malicious PDF on Telegram, posing as a trusted ex-contractor; malware compromised at least 3 developer hardware wallets by replacing Safe Wallet front-end display while submitting malicious transactions for signing</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Safe Wallet (multi-sig infrastructure)</breach:vendorProduct><breach:malware>InletDrift</breach:malware></item><item><title>WazirX Cryptocurrency Exchange Hack</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2024-07_wazirx-lazarus-multisig/</link><pubDate>Thu, 18 Jul 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2024-07_wazirx-lazarus-multisig/</guid><description>$234.9 million in crypto assets stolen from Indian exchange WazirX on 18 July 2024. Attributed to North Korea&amp;#39;s Lazarus Group by joint US/Japan/South Korea statement in January 2025. Attackers created a fake account, deposited tokens, then manipulated the multisig wallet&amp;#39;s smart contract once three …</description><content:encoded>$234.9 million in crypto assets stolen from Indian exchange WazirX on 18 July 2024. Attributed to North Korea&amp;rsquo;s Lazarus Group by joint US/Japan/South Korea statement in January 2025. Attackers created a fake account, deposited tokens, then manipulated the multisig wallet&amp;rsquo;s smart contract once three developer signatures were collected from compromised devices. WazirX suspended withdrawals. Singapore High Court sanctioned a restructuring scheme in October 2025 returning approximately 85% of funds to users.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://therecord.media/wazirx-crypto-platform-confirms-230-million-heist</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2024-07-18</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2024-07-18</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2024-07-19</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Lazarus Group (North Korea) compromised WazirX multi-signature wallet by social engineering developers and manipulating Safe Wallet front-end; malware replaced legitimate transaction displays to collect hardware wallet signatures</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Liminal Custody (multi-sig wallet infrastructure)</breach:vendorProduct><breach:malware>Safe Wallet front-end manipulation / transaction substitution</breach:malware></item><item><title>DMM Bitcoin Hack - TraderTraitor (North Korea)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2024-05_dmm-bitcoin-tradertraitor/</link><pubDate>Fri, 31 May 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2024-05_dmm-bitcoin-tradertraitor/</guid><description>North Korean TraderTraitor hackers stole 4,502.9 BTC (~$308 million) from Japanese crypto exchange DMM Bitcoin on 31 May 2024 — the third-largest crypto theft in history. FBI, DC3, and Japan NPA jointly attributed the attack in December 2024. The compromise flowed through Ginco, a third-party wallet …</description><content:encoded>North Korean TraderTraitor hackers stole 4,502.9 BTC (~$308 million) from Japanese crypto exchange DMM Bitcoin on 31 May 2024 — the third-largest crypto theft in history. FBI, DC3, and Japan NPA jointly attributed the attack in December 2024. The compromise flowed through Ginco, a third-party wallet provider. DMM Bitcoin was unable to recover and shut down in December 2024, transferring accounts to SBI VC Trade.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-dc3-and-npa-identification-of-north-korean-cyber-actors-tracked-as-tradertraitor-responsible-for-theft-of-308-million-from-bitcoindmmcom</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2024-05-31</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2024-05-31</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2024-06-01</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>TraderTraitor (North Korean) social engineering of an employee at crypto wallet company Ginco; attackers gained access to Ginco communications systems and intercepted a legitimate DMM Bitcoin transaction</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Ginco (crypto wallet provider)</breach:vendorProduct><breach:supplyChainClaimed>true</breach:supplyChainClaimed></item><item><title>Roku credential stuffing attack (576,000 accounts)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2024-04_roku-credential-stuffing/</link><pubDate>Fri, 01 Mar 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2024-04_roku-credential-stuffing/</guid><description>Second Roku credential stuffing incident of 2024 (first: ~15,000 accounts in March). Attackers used username/password pairs from prior unrelated breaches to authenticate against Roku accounts. 576,000 accounts compromised. In fewer than 400 cases, attackers used stored payment methods to purchase …</description><content:encoded>Second Roku credential stuffing incident of 2024 (first: ~15,000 accounts in March). Attackers used username/password pairs from prior unrelated breaches to authenticate against Roku accounts. 576,000 accounts compromised. In fewer than 400 cases, attackers used stored payment methods to purchase streaming subscriptions and Roku hardware. Full credit card numbers not accessible. Roku enabled mandatory two-factor authentication for all 80 million user accounts in response. Roku stated its systems were not breached — credentials came from third-party data.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/roku-warns-576-000-accounts-hacked-in-new-credential-stuffing-attacks/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2024-03-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2024-04-12</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2024-04-12</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts (credential stuffing using credentials stolen from third-party breaches)</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Roku streaming platform</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>Tycoon2FA Phishing-as-a-Service Platform — AiTM MFA Bypass, Rebound 2026</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2024-01_tycoon2fa-phishing-as-a-service-aitm/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2024-01_tycoon2fa-phishing-as-a-service-aitm/</guid><description>Tycoon2FA is a sophisticated phishing-as-a-service platform discovered in 2023 and analysed in depth by Sekoia.io in March 2024. The platform operates as a reverse proxy between victims and legitimate Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace login pages, using adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) techniques to …</description><content:encoded>Tycoon2FA is a sophisticated phishing-as-a-service platform discovered in 2023 and analysed in depth by Sekoia.io in March 2024. The platform operates as a reverse proxy between victims and legitimate Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace login pages, using adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) techniques to capture session tokens after MFA authentication is completed — effectively stealing already-authenticated sessions that bypass MFA protection entirely. Unlike traditional phishing that steals credentials, Tycoon2FA captures the session cookie that Microsoft or Google issues after a successful MFA authentication, allowing the attacker to impersonate the victim immediately without needing their password or MFA device. The platform was sold as a subscription service ($120/month) on Telegram criminal marketplaces and included anti-bot mechanisms, Cloudflare Turnstile CAPTCHA bypass, and ongoing evasion updates. Tycoon2FA targeted organisations across financial services, healthcare, legal, and technology sectors globally. Microsoft and Google implemented detection and blocking measures. Law enforcement and CISA issued guidance on AiTM phishing. In March 2026, Tycoon2FA was reported to have &amp;lsquo;rebounded&amp;rsquo; — meaning the platform had resumed or expanded operations after prior disruption attempts, with new evasion techniques and infrastructure. The platform&amp;rsquo;s resilience mirrors other PhaaS platforms including EvilProxy, Modlishka, and Evilginx2 which similarly implement AiTM techniques against cloud identity providers.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.databreachtoday.com/breach-roundup-tycoon2fa-phishing-platform-rebounds-a-31220</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2024-01-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2024-03-01</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:initialAttackVector>Tycoon2FA is a phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform that implements adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) techniques using reverse proxy infrastructure to intercept and steal session cookies from Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace users, bypassing multi-factor authentication in real time</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace tenants (targeted via Tycoon2FA phishing kit)</breach:vendorProduct><breach:malware>Tycoon2FA phishing kit</breach:malware></item><item><title>Microsoft corporate email breach by Midnight Blizzard (Nobelium / APT29)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2024-01_microsoft-midnight-blizzard/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Nov 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2024-01_microsoft-midnight-blizzard/</guid><description>Midnight Blizzard (Russian SVR, also known as Nobelium/Cozy Bear/APT29) conducted a password spray attack against a legacy Microsoft test tenant account with no MFA enabled in November 2023. Using that account&amp;#39;s permissions, attackers accessed a small percentage of corporate email accounts including …</description><content:encoded>Midnight Blizzard (Russian SVR, also known as Nobelium/Cozy Bear/APT29) conducted a password spray attack against a legacy Microsoft test tenant account with no MFA enabled in November 2023. Using that account&amp;rsquo;s permissions, attackers accessed a small percentage of corporate email accounts including senior executives and staff in cybersecurity and legal departments. Detected 12 January 2024, disclosed 19 January 2024. Subsequent investigation (March 2024) revealed attackers also accessed some Microsoft source code repositories and internal systems using information exfiltrated from the corporate emails. CISA emergency directive issued. This was part of a broader Midnight Blizzard campaign targeting governments and tech companies.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/blog/2024/01/microsoft-actions-following-attack-by-nation-state-actor-midnight-blizzard</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2023-11-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2024-01-19</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2024-03-08</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts (password spray attack against a legacy non-production test tenant account lacking MFA)</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Microsoft corporate Office 365 email / source code repositories</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>MyDeal Australia Data Breach — 2.2 Million Customers via Compromised Credentials</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2022-10_mydeal-australia-2-2m/</link><pubDate>Sun, 09 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2022-10_mydeal-australia-2-2m/</guid><description>On 9 October 2022, MyDeal — an Australian online retail marketplace owned by Woolworths Group (acquired in 2022 for A$217 million) — was breached via compromised user credentials that provided access to the company&amp;#39;s CRM system. The attack exposed data for approximately 2.2 million MyDeal customers. …</description><content:encoded>On 9 October 2022, MyDeal — an Australian online retail marketplace owned by Woolworths Group (acquired in 2022 for A$217 million) — was breached via compromised user credentials that provided access to the company&amp;rsquo;s CRM system. The attack exposed data for approximately 2.2 million MyDeal customers. Exposed data included names, email addresses, phone numbers, delivery addresses, and partial dates of birth. Payment information was not stored in the compromised system and was not affected. MyDeal disclosed the breach on 16 October 2022 and notified the Australian Cyber Security Centre and relevant authorities under Australia&amp;rsquo;s mandatory NDB scheme. MyDeal was in the process of being integrated into Woolworths Group&amp;rsquo;s systems following the recent acquisition. Woolworths Group clarified that its own systems and customer data were not affected. The breach occurred during a period of heightened attention to Australian data security following the high-profile Optus breach (22 September 2022) and shortly before the Medibank Private breach (12 October 2022), creating a period of intense focus on Australian data breach practices and regulatory requirements. The OAIC opened an investigation. The incident highlighted risks during corporate acquisitions when data systems are being integrated.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.oaic.gov.au/updates/news-and-media/mydeal-data-breach</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2022-10-09</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2022-10-16</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2022-10-16</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Attacker used compromised user credentials to access MyDeal's CRM system, which contained customer data; the compromised credentials allowed the attacker to extract approximately 2.2 million customer records</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>MyDeal CRM system</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>Dark Reading / UpGuard / InfoQ</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2022-09_uber-mfa-fatigue/</link><pubDate>Thu, 15 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2022-09_uber-mfa-fatigue/</guid><description>18-year-old Lapsus$-affiliated attacker purchased stolen contractor VPN credentials from dark web. Bypassed Duo MFA by bombing target with push notifications for &amp;gt;1 hour then impersonating Uber IT support via WhatsApp to get approval. Discovered plaintext Thycotic PAM admin credentials in a …</description><content:encoded>18-year-old Lapsus$-affiliated attacker purchased stolen contractor VPN credentials from dark web. Bypassed Duo MFA by bombing target with push notifications for &amp;gt;1 hour then impersonating Uber IT support via WhatsApp to get approval. Discovered plaintext Thycotic PAM admin credentials in a PowerShell script post-VPN. Accessed G-Suite, Slack, HackerOne reports, financial invoicing tool. No customer data confirmed stolen. Attacker publicly posted in Uber&amp;rsquo;s Slack.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.darkreading.com/cyberattacks-data-breaches/uber-breach-external-contractor-mfa-bombing-attack</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2022-09-15</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2022-09-19</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2022-09-19</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>CWE-1390: Weak Authentication (MFA push notification fatigue / bombing combined with social engineering via WhatsApp)</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Uber corporate network / Thycotic PAM</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>Revolut Social Engineering Attack (50K Customers)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2022-09_revolut-social-engineering-50k/</link><pubDate>Sun, 11 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2022-09_revolut-social-engineering-50k/</guid><description>On September 11, 2022, Revolut — a UK/EU-based neobank and fintech company with over 20 million customers — suffered a brief but significant data breach via a social engineering attack. A threat actor used phishing techniques to trick a Revolut employee into granting access to internal systems, …</description><content:encoded>On September 11, 2022, Revolut — a UK/EU-based neobank and fintech company with over 20 million customers — suffered a brief but significant data breach via a social engineering attack. A threat actor used phishing techniques to trick a Revolut employee into granting access to internal systems, which were quickly isolated upon detection overnight. Approximately 50,150 customers were affected (0.16% of Revolut&amp;rsquo;s global user base at the time), including 20,687 EEA-based customers. Exposed data included names, postal addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers, and partial payment card details (masked card numbers only — no full card numbers, PINs, or passwords). No customer funds were accessed or transferred. Revolut notified affected customers directly and warned of heightened phishing risk from criminals who might use the stolen contact information. Revolut submitted its breach notification to the Lithuanian Data Protection Authority (VDAI), as Revolut holds its EU banking license through Lithuania. The attack occurred during the same period as the broader &amp;lsquo;0ktapus&amp;rsquo; social engineering wave targeting tech companies (Twilio, DoorDash, etc.), though Revolut has not confirmed whether this attack was part of the same campaign.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://techcrunch.com/2022/09/20/revolut-cyberattack-thousands-exposed/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2022-09-11</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2022-09-20</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2022-09-19</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Social engineering — a threat actor used targeted phishing/social engineering techniques against a Revolut employee to obtain credentials, gaining unauthorized access to Revolut's internal database systems</breach:initialAttackVector></item><item><title>Revolut Social Engineering Customer Data Breach — 50,150 Users</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2022-09_revolut-social-engineering/</link><pubDate>Sun, 11 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2022-09_revolut-social-engineering/</guid><description>On 11 September 2022, an attacker used a sophisticated social engineering technique to gain access to Revolut&amp;#39;s customer support system through a Revolut employee. The attacker accessed and potentially exfiltrated data for 50,150 customers (approximately 0.16% of Revolut&amp;#39;s total customer base of …</description><content:encoded>On 11 September 2022, an attacker used a sophisticated social engineering technique to gain access to Revolut&amp;rsquo;s customer support system through a Revolut employee. The attacker accessed and potentially exfiltrated data for 50,150 customers (approximately 0.16% of Revolut&amp;rsquo;s total customer base of approximately 30 million). Revolut confirmed that for a short period of time the attacker was able to access the details of a small percentage of customers. Exposed data included names, addresses, email addresses, phone numbers, partial payment card data, and account data. Revolut stated that card details, PINs, or passwords were not accessed, and that no funds were accessed or stolen. Revolut detected the unauthorized access in the early hours of 12 September, terminated the access, and notified the Lithuanian State Data Protection Inspectorate (Revolut&amp;rsquo;s EU banking license is in Lithuania) as required under GDPR. Some affected customers reported receiving phishing texts after the breach, suggesting the stolen data was used for follow-on attacks. The incident occurred during a period when Revolut was experiencing high-profile cyberattacks and while the company was applying for its UK banking license. The breach type — using employee social engineering to access customer databases — was consistent with tactics used by the 0ktapus/Scattered Spider group that targeted multiple companies in the same period.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://blog.revolut.com/a-message-to-our-customers-about-a-recent-security-incident/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2022-09-11</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2022-09-19</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2022-09-19</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Targeted social engineering attack against a Revolut employee who was tricked into granting the attacker access to Revolut's internal customer support database; the attacker used the employee's legitimate credentials and access to query and exfiltrate customer records</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Revolut internal customer support database</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>Marriott International 2022 Social Engineering Breach — 20GB Data Stolen</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2022-06_marriott-social-engineering-20gb/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jun 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2022-06_marriott-social-engineering-20gb/</guid><description>In June 2022, Marriott International suffered its third significant data breach in four years (after the 2018 Starwood breach affecting 383M guests and the 2020 employee credential breach affecting 5.2M guests). A threat actor used social engineering to trick an employee at a Marriott property in …</description><content:encoded>In June 2022, Marriott International suffered its third significant data breach in four years (after the 2018 Starwood breach affecting 383M guests and the 2020 employee credential breach affecting 5.2M guests). A threat actor used social engineering to trick an employee at a Marriott property in Maryland into granting access to their workstation. The attacker then exfiltrated approximately 20 gigabytes of data. Marriott disclosed the breach on 5 July 2022. The breach affected a small number of files — Marriott stated the data impacted approximately 300-400 individuals, primarily employees. The stolen data included business files and customer credit card information for a limited number of guests. However, the group responsible (calling themselves &amp;lsquo;GRP8&amp;rsquo;) attempted to extort Marriott and eventually shared some of the data with DataBreaches.net. The data allegedly included customer credit card numbers, confidential hotel source code, and employee ID information. The Maryland attorney general was notified. Marriott is one of the world&amp;rsquo;s largest hotel chains with approximately 8,000 properties. This third breach in four years demonstrated persistent vulnerability to social engineering despite presumably enhanced security following previous incidents. The UK ICO noted the pattern of Marriott breaches in its communications.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/marriott-international-confirms-another-data-breach-affecting-300-to-400-individuals/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2022-06-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2022-07-05</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2022-07-05</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Attacker used social engineering to trick a Marriott employee at a Maryland property into granting remote access to their workstation; once access was established, approximately 20GB of data was exfiltrated over a period prior to detection</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Marriott International employee workstation / local property data</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>Cisco Yanluowang Ransomware Attack — Employee Google Account and VPN Breach</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2022-05_cisco-yanluowang-mfa-fatigue/</link><pubDate>Tue, 24 May 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2022-05_cisco-yanluowang-mfa-fatigue/</guid><description>On 24 May 2022, a Yanluowang ransomware affiliate (linked to UNC2447/Lapsus$ connections) compromised Cisco Systems through a combination of credential theft from a personal Google account and MFA push fatigue. The attacker gained access to a Cisco employee&amp;#39;s personal Google Chrome browser which had …</description><content:encoded>On 24 May 2022, a Yanluowang ransomware affiliate (linked to UNC2447/Lapsus$ connections) compromised Cisco Systems through a combination of credential theft from a personal Google account and MFA push fatigue. The attacker gained access to a Cisco employee&amp;rsquo;s personal Google Chrome browser which had VPN credentials saved and synced to the Google account. The personal Google account was compromised by the attacker. The attacker then conducted weeks of vishing calls pretending to be from Cisco, Verizon, and other trusted organizations, pressuring the employee to accept MFA push notifications. Once VPN access was obtained, the attacker escalated to Citrix, moved to Domain Controllers, and eventually gained Tier-0 access to the Cisco network. Cisco detected and responded to the attack on 24 May 2022. The attacker published a list of 2.8GB of data they claimed to have exfiltrated from Cisco. Cisco stated no customer data, sensitive government information, or employee financial/HR data was accessed. The attacker also briefly deployed ransomware which Cisco blocked. Yanluowang has since been partially disabled (its encryption capabilities were found to be flawed). Cisco published a detailed threat intelligence report on the incident. The breach demonstrated sophisticated social engineering capabilities and the risk of credential synchronisation between personal and corporate browser profiles.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://blog.cisco.com/security/cisco-security-incident-response</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2022-05-24</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2022-08-10</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:initialAttackVector>Yanluowang ransomware affiliate gained access to a Cisco employee's personal Google Chrome profile that had Cisco VPN credentials saved; the employee's personal Google account was compromised, exposing the saved credentials; the attacker then conducted extensive MFA push fatigue attacks and vishing calls impersonating Cisco IT support to convince the employee to approve MFA push notifications</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Cisco corporate network / VPN</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>Microsoft LAPSUS$ Breach: Bing, Bing Maps, Cortana Source Code Exfiltrated</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2022-03_microsoft-lapsus-bing-cortana-source/</link><pubDate>Sun, 20 Mar 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2022-03_microsoft-lapsus-bing-cortana-source/</guid><description>On March 20, 2022, LAPSUS$ posted a screenshot on Telegram showing they had access to Microsoft&amp;#39;s internal Azure DevOps environment, including source code repositories for Bing, Bing Maps, and Cortana. Microsoft detected the intrusion and interrupted the attackers during the operation. LAPSUS$ …</description><content:encoded>On March 20, 2022, LAPSUS$ posted a screenshot on Telegram showing they had access to Microsoft&amp;rsquo;s internal Azure DevOps environment, including source code repositories for Bing, Bing Maps, and Cortana. Microsoft detected the intrusion and interrupted the attackers during the operation. LAPSUS$ subsequently published approximately 37GB of source code from 250 Azure DevOps projects. Microsoft confirmed the breach, stating that a single account was compromised and that the attacker did not have access to customer data. Microsoft&amp;rsquo;s investigation found the breach was achieved through LAPSUS$&amp;rsquo;s signature tactic of compromising individual employee accounts — in this case through recruiting an insider or obtaining credentials through phishing/credential theft. Microsoft noted that LAPSUS$ used legitimate remote access tools including AnyDesk, TeamViewer, and Windows built-in tools to maintain access. This breach occurred the same week LAPSUS$ arrested members in the UK included two teenagers (ages 16 and 17). Part of a broader LAPSUS$ rampage in early 2022 that also hit Okta, Nvidia, Samsung, Vodafone, and others.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2022-03-20</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2022-03-22</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2022-03-22</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>LAPSUS$ (DEV-0537) compromised a single Microsoft employee account and used it to access Microsoft's Azure DevOps source code repositories</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Microsoft Azure DevOps</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>NVIDIA LAPSUS$ Breach: GPU Designs, DLSS Source Code, 71K Employee Credentials</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2022-02_nvidia-lapsus-gpu-source-code/</link><pubDate>Wed, 23 Feb 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2022-02_nvidia-lapsus-gpu-source-code/</guid><description>On February 23, 2022, LAPSUS$ — a cybercriminal extortion group — gained access to NVIDIA&amp;#39;s internal systems and exfiltrated approximately 1TB of data. NVIDIA was alerted to the intrusion and retaliated by pushing a counter-ransomware script onto LAPSUS$&amp;#39;s machine (allegedly an attempt to encrypt …</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[On February 23, 2022, LAPSUS$ — a cybercriminal extortion group — gained access to NVIDIA&rsquo;s internal systems and exfiltrated approximately 1TB of data. NVIDIA was alerted to the intrusion and retaliated by pushing a counter-ransomware script onto LAPSUS$&rsquo;s machine (allegedly an attempt to encrypt the stolen data back), which failed. LAPSUS$ published the stolen data online. The exfiltrated data included: approximately 71,000+ NVIDIA employee credentials (usernames and NTLM hashed passwords); proprietary source code for DLSS (Deep Learning Super Sampling), a flagship AI image upscaling technology; internal software tools; GPU design documentation; and Lite Hash Rate (LHR) firmware files that LAPSUS$ published specifically to enable GPU mining for cryptocurrencies (circumventing NVIDIA&rsquo;s deliberate mining rate-limiter). Most significantly, LAPSUS$ published code-signing certificates from the stolen data — certificates that were still valid and could be used to sign malware as if it were legitimate NVIDIA software. These certificates were quickly absorbed by other threat actors and used to sign malware in multiple campaigns. This was one of LAPSUS$&rsquo;s first major high-profile attacks, occurring in the same period as their attacks on Samsung, Okta, and Microsoft.]]></content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/nvidia-confirms-employee-credentials-were-stolen-in-cyberattack/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2022-02-23</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2022-03-01</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2022-03-01</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>LAPSUS$ gained access to NVIDIA's network (method not fully disclosed, believed to involve compromised employee VPN credentials and an employee whose personal computer was infected with malware connecting to corporate systems)</breach:initialAttackVector></item><item><title>Robinhood Customer Support Social Engineering Breach (7M Records)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2021-11_robinhood-social-engineering-7m/</link><pubDate>Wed, 03 Nov 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2021-11_robinhood-social-engineering-7m/</guid><description>On November 3, 2021, an attacker called Robinhood&amp;#39;s customer support line and socially engineered a customer support employee into granting them unauthorized access to the customer support systems. Using this access, the attacker exfiltrated data for approximately 7 million customers. Approximately …</description><content:encoded>On November 3, 2021, an attacker called Robinhood&amp;rsquo;s customer support line and socially engineered a customer support employee into granting them unauthorized access to the customer support systems. Using this access, the attacker exfiltrated data for approximately 7 million customers. Approximately 5 million customers had their email addresses exposed; approximately 2 million had their full names exposed. A more limited subset of approximately 310 customers had additional personal information including name, date of birth, and zip code exposed; about 10 customers had &amp;lsquo;more extensive account details&amp;rsquo; exposed. The attacker then attempted to extort Robinhood, demanding payment. Robinhood refused and reported the matter to law enforcement. The breach was disclosed 5 days after it occurred. The incident highlighted the vulnerability of customer support channels as attack vectors — particularly for financial services companies where support staff have access to sensitive account information.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://blog.robinhood.com/news/2021/11/8/data-security-incident</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2021-11-03</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2021-11-08</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2021-11-09</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Attacker called a Robinhood customer support phone line and social-engineered a support employee into providing access to the customer support system, then used that access to exfiltrate customer records</breach:initialAttackVector></item><item><title>GoDaddy WordPress Managed Hosting Breach (1.2M Customers, SSL Keys Exposed)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2021-11_godaddy-wordpress-hosting-1m/</link><pubDate>Mon, 06 Sep 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2021-11_godaddy-wordpress-hosting-1m/</guid><description>On September 6, 2021, an attacker used a compromised password to access GoDaddy&amp;#39;s Managed WordPress hosting provisioning system, where they maintained access for over two months before being detected on November 17, 2021. GoDaddy filed an SEC 8-K disclosing the breach on November 22. Approximately …</description><content:encoded>On September 6, 2021, an attacker used a compromised password to access GoDaddy&amp;rsquo;s Managed WordPress hosting provisioning system, where they maintained access for over two months before being detected on November 17, 2021. GoDaddy filed an SEC 8-K disclosing the breach on November 22. Approximately 1.2 million active and inactive Managed WordPress customer accounts were affected. Exposed data included email addresses, sFTP (Secure FTP) credentials, database usernames and passwords, and SSL private keys for active customers — the SSL private keys effectively allowed the attacker to impersonate any affected customer&amp;rsquo;s website. GoDaddy reset all sFTP passwords and database credentials, and reissued SSL certificates. The exposure of SSL private keys was particularly severe, as it could enable man-in-the-middle attacks against website visitors even after the credentials were rotated, until affected certificates expired or were reissued across the ecosystem.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1609711/000160971121000122/0001609711-21-000122-index.htm</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2021-09-06</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2021-11-22</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2021-11-22</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Attacker used a compromised password to gain access to GoDaddy's Managed WordPress provisioning system; the password granted access since at least September 6, 2021 — giving the attacker 2+ months of undetected access</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>GoDaddy Managed WordPress</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>Spotify Credential Stuffing Attack — ~350K Accounts</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2020-11_spotify-credential-stuffing-350k/</link><pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2020-11_spotify-credential-stuffing-350k/</guid><description>In November 2020, security researchers at vpnMentor discovered an unsecured Elasticsearch database containing approximately 380 million records including usernames, passwords, and email addresses that were being used in credential stuffing attacks against Spotify. Spotify confirmed to vpnMentor that …</description><content:encoded>In November 2020, security researchers at vpnMentor discovered an unsecured Elasticsearch database containing approximately 380 million records including usernames, passwords, and email addresses that were being used in credential stuffing attacks against Spotify. Spotify confirmed to vpnMentor that it had initiated a password reset for affected users and had worked with the researchers to take down the database (which was hosted by a third party running the credential stuffing operation). Spotify stated the credentials were not obtained from Spotify&amp;rsquo;s own systems but from prior unrelated breaches — the classic credential stuffing scenario where attackers rely on password reuse. Spotify issued password resets to approximately 350,000 accounts that were identified as having been successfully accessed via the attack. The company filed suit against the unidentified operators of the database. The incident occurred during a period of heightened credential stuffing activity across many platforms (2020 also saw similar attacks against Nintendo, Zoom, and others) driven by the massive accumulation of breached credential databases available on underground markets.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.vpnmentor.com/blog/report-spotify-data-breach/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2020-09-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2020-11-23</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2020-11-23</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Credential stuffing — attackers used a database of approximately 380 million records (username/password pairs from unrelated third-party breaches) to systematically attempt logins on Spotify accounts; valid credential matches were used for account takeover</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Spotify</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>Twitter 2020 Bitcoin Scam: Social Engineering of Admin Tools (130 High-Profile Accounts)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2020-07_twitter-bitcoin-scam-vishing/</link><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2020-07_twitter-bitcoin-scam-vishing/</guid><description>On July 15, 2020, attackers hijacked approximately 130 high-profile Twitter accounts including Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Elon Musk, Bill Gates, Apple, Uber, Jeff Bezos, Kanye West, Mike Bloomberg, and others to post Bitcoin scam messages. The attackers used vishing (phone-based social engineering) to …</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[On July 15, 2020, attackers hijacked approximately 130 high-profile Twitter accounts including Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Elon Musk, Bill Gates, Apple, Uber, Jeff Bezos, Kanye West, Mike Bloomberg, and others to post Bitcoin scam messages. The attackers used vishing (phone-based social engineering) to impersonate Twitter&rsquo;s IT department and trick Twitter employees — who were working from home due to COVID-19 — into providing their credentials to a fake corporate VPN portal. With these credentials, they accessed Twitter&rsquo;s internal &lsquo;admin panel&rsquo; and gained the ability to take over any account. The scam Bitcoin wallets received approximately $120,000 before Twitter suspended the accounts. The attackers also accessed the DMs of 36 high-profile accounts and downloaded the full data archives of 8 non-verified accounts. Twitter was forced to temporarily disable the ability for verified accounts to tweet. The FBI arrested the three perpetrators: Graham Ivan Clark, 17, of Tampa (the alleged ringleader); Mason Sheppard, 19, of UK; and Nima Fazeli, 22, of Orlando. Clark was sentenced to 3 years in a juvenile facility. The attack demonstrated that even the most sophisticated platform security could be undermined by basic social engineering of employees — and that COVID-era remote work created new social engineering opportunities.]]></content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/an-update-on-our-security-incident</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2020-07-15</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2020-07-15</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2020-07-15</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Vishing (voice phishing) calls targeting Twitter employees not in the office due to COVID-19; attackers impersonated Twitter IT staff to trick employees into providing credentials to a fake VPN portal, then used those credentials to access Twitter's internal admin tools</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Twitter internal admin tools ('God Mode')</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>MEDNAX AWS Misconfiguration Breach — 1.3 Million Patients via Phishing</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2020-06_mednax-office365-phishing-1-3m/</link><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2020-06_mednax-office365-phishing-1-3m/</guid><description>In June 2020, MEDNAX — a national health solutions company providing physician services management, including neonatology and pediatric subspecialty care, to approximately 120,000 patients annually — suffered a phishing attack that compromised multiple employee Microsoft Office 365 email accounts. …</description><content:encoded>In June 2020, MEDNAX — a national health solutions company providing physician services management, including neonatology and pediatric subspecialty care, to approximately 120,000 patients annually — suffered a phishing attack that compromised multiple employee Microsoft Office 365 email accounts. The attackers used the compromised accounts to access MEDNAX&amp;rsquo;s business systems and extract patient data. Approximately 1.29 million patients were affected. Exposed data included patient names, dates of service, diagnoses, health insurance information, Social Security numbers, claims information, and other health data. MEDNAX filed an HHS OCR breach notification on 25 September 2020 covering patients from across its managed medical practices. MEDNAX notified affected patients and offered credit monitoring. HHS OCR opened an investigation. The breach occurred during an unprecedented period of healthcare phishing attacks during COVID-19. MEDNAX operates through over 4,400 affiliated physicians across hospitals in 38 states. The phishing compromise of multiple Office 365 accounts highlighted the inadequacy of password-only authentication for healthcare email systems and the persistent risk of business email compromise (BEC) in healthcare — where attackers access systems through legitimate employee email accounts rather than hacking directly.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach_report.jsf</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2020-06-17</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2020-09-25</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2020-09-25</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>A phishing attack compromised the Microsoft Office 365 email accounts of multiple MEDNAX employees; the attackers used the compromised email accounts to access MEDNAX's business systems and then exfiltrated patient data from the company's healthcare platforms</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>MEDNAX Microsoft Office 365 / patient data systems</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>Wattpad Data Breach (268M Users, ShinyHunters)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2020-07_wattpad-shinyhunters-268m/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2020-07_wattpad-shinyhunters-268m/</guid><description>In approximately June 2020, ShinyHunters — a prolific cybercrime group responsible for multiple major 2020 breaches (Tokopedia, Dave.com, Microsoft GitHub repos) — breached Wattpad and exfiltrated approximately 268 million user records. The database was initially offered for sale at $100,000 on …</description><content:encoded>In approximately June 2020, ShinyHunters — a prolific cybercrime group responsible for multiple major 2020 breaches (Tokopedia, Dave.com, Microsoft GitHub repos) — breached Wattpad and exfiltrated approximately 268 million user records. The database was initially offered for sale at $100,000 on hacking forums, but was eventually published for free on hacking forums in July 2020 after failing to find buyers at the asking price. BleepingComputer and Troy Hunt (HaveIBeenPwned) reported on the breach on July 14, 2020. Exposed data included usernames, email addresses, IP addresses, dates of birth (a concern given many Wattpad users are minors), passwords (bcrypt-hashed), gender, geographic location, and various account metadata. Wattpad forced password resets and notified affected users. The breach raised COPPA and GDPR compliance concerns given Wattpad&amp;rsquo;s large population of young and underage users. The breach was part of a major wave of ShinyHunters activity throughout 2020 that exposed over 1 billion records combined from multiple platforms. Wattpad is a user-generated stories platform particularly popular with teenagers and young adults; at the time of the breach it had over 90 million monthly active users and had been recently acquired by South Korean company Naver.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/wattpad-data-breach-exposes-account-info-for-millions-of-users/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2020-06-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2020-07-14</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2020-07-14</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Unauthorized database access by ShinyHunters threat group; exact initial access vector not disclosed by Wattpad; database exfiltrated containing 268M user account records</breach:initialAttackVector></item><item><title>Service NSW Phishing Breach — 186,000 Customers, 3.8 Million Documents</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2020-04_service-nsw-phishing-186k/</link><pubDate>Sat, 04 Apr 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2020-04_service-nsw-phishing-186k/</guid><description>In April 2020, 47 Service NSW employee email accounts were compromised through a phishing attack, allowing unauthorized access to customer data processed through those email accounts. Service NSW is the New South Wales government agency that provides services including driver&amp;#39;s licences, vehicle …</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[In April 2020, 47 Service NSW employee email accounts were compromised through a phishing attack, allowing unauthorized access to customer data processed through those email accounts. Service NSW is the New South Wales government agency that provides services including driver&rsquo;s licences, vehicle registration, and government benefits to all NSW residents. The breach was discovered on 4 April 2020. Approximately 186,000 customers were affected. The breach exposed approximately 3.8 million documents — a combination of documents from Service NSW systems and from customers&rsquo; correspondence with Service NSW. This included copies of documents submitted by customers such as driver&rsquo;s licences, financial statements, Medicare cards, passports, and other government identity documents that customers had provided when applying for services. Service NSW disclosed the breach on 19 May 2020. The NSW Privacy Commissioner opened an investigation. The OAIC was notified. Service NSW offered affected customers identity protection services. The theft of documents submitted by citizens to a government service agency is particularly serious because it may expose the entirety of citizens&rsquo; identity document portfolio — not just one form of ID. The breach prompted significant reforms to Service NSW&rsquo;s email security and identity document handling procedures. It highlighted the risk of government agencies storing sensitive identity documents in email attachments.]]></content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.service.nsw.gov.au/campaign/service-nsw-cyber-attack</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2020-04-04</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2020-05-19</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2020-05-19</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Phishing emails compromised the email accounts of 47 Service NSW staff members; from the compromised email accounts, attackers were able to access customer data processed through Service NSW email correspondence and attached documents</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Service NSW staff email accounts / customer correspondence</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>Nintendo Account Credential Stuffing — 160,000 Accounts Breached</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2020-04_nintendo-credential-stuffing-160k/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2020-04_nintendo-credential-stuffing-160k/</guid><description>In April 2020, Nintendo disclosed that approximately 160,000 Nintendo accounts had been accessed without authorisation using a credential stuffing attack against the Nintendo Network ID (NNID) login system. Nintendo subsequently revised the number upward to approximately 300,000 accounts when …</description><content:encoded>In April 2020, Nintendo disclosed that approximately 160,000 Nintendo accounts had been accessed without authorisation using a credential stuffing attack against the Nintendo Network ID (NNID) login system. Nintendo subsequently revised the number upward to approximately 300,000 accounts when additional victims were identified. The attackers used NNID (the legacy login system for Nintendo 3DS and Wii U platforms) as a vector to log into Nintendo Accounts — accessing games libraries, stored payment information, and Nintendo eShop credit. Many affected users reported fraudulent purchases via PayPal or credit cards linked to their accounts, with attackers purchasing digital games and currency. Nintendo notified affected users and disabled NNID sign-in capability for Nintendo Accounts, requiring users to reset passwords. Affected users were reimbursed for any fraudulent purchases. The breach coincided with a massive surge in Nintendo Switch sales during the COVID-19 pandemic — Animal Crossing: New Horizons had just launched in March 2020 and was selling at record pace — making Nintendo accounts particularly valuable for accessing Switch games. The breach highlighted the risks of maintaining legacy login systems with weaker security alongside newer account systems. Nintendo accounts were a high-value target due to stored payment methods and the gaming market value of digital goods.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://en-americas-support.nintendo.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/53911/~/important-information-about-your-nintendo-account</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2020-04-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2020-04-24</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2020-04-24</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Attackers used credential stuffing — username and password combinations from other data breaches — to log into Nintendo accounts via the legacy Nintendo Network ID (NNID) login system; the NNID system was being deprecated and allowed third-party login to Nintendo accounts</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Nintendo Account / Nintendo Network ID (NNID) system</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>Nintendo Network ID (NNID) Credential Stuffing — 160,000 Accounts Compromised</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2020-04_nintendo-160k-account-takeover/</link><pubDate>Sun, 01 Mar 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2020-04_nintendo-160k-account-takeover/</guid><description>In April 2020, Nintendo disclosed that approximately 160,000 Nintendo Network IDs (NNIDs) — a legacy login system from the Nintendo 3DS and Wii U era — had been compromised via credential stuffing between March and April 2020. Attackers used previously leaked credentials to log in via the NNID login …</description><content:encoded>In April 2020, Nintendo disclosed that approximately 160,000 Nintendo Network IDs (NNIDs) — a legacy login system from the Nintendo 3DS and Wii U era — had been compromised via credential stuffing between March and April 2020. Attackers used previously leaked credentials to log in via the NNID login portal, and because Nintendo had enabled NNID accounts to be linked to Nintendo Accounts (the current Switch-era system), attackers could access the linked Nintendo Account and view personal information and in some cases make fraudulent purchases using saved PayPal or credit card credentials. Exposed data included nicknames, dates of birth, countries of residence, and email addresses. Nintendo disabled the ability to use NNIDs to log into Nintendo Accounts as an immediate mitigation and reset passwords for all affected accounts. Nintendo subsequently updated its total estimate upward — later reports indicated up to 300,000 accounts may have been affected. Nintendo advised users to enable two-factor authentication and to change passwords. The incident was amplified by the surge in Nintendo Switch sales and online gaming activity during COVID-19 lockdowns.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52492772</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2020-03-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2020-04-24</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2020-04-24</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Credential stuffing — attackers used previously leaked username/password combinations to log into Nintendo Network IDs (NNIDs) via a legacy login portal; successful logins allowed attackers to access linked Nintendo Accounts and make fraudulent purchases via saved payment methods</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Nintendo Network ID (NNID) / Nintendo Account</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>T-Mobile / Motherboard Vice / BleepingComputer</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2020-03_t-mobile-200k-breach/</link><pubDate>Wed, 19 Feb 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2020-03_t-mobile-200k-breach/</guid><description>T-Mobile disclosed a breach on March 5 2020 affecting approximately 200,000 customers. Attackers had accessed some T-Mobile employee email accounts containing customer proprietary network information (CPNI), including names, addresses, phone numbers, account numbers, rate plans, and features. The …</description><content:encoded>T-Mobile disclosed a breach on March 5 2020 affecting approximately 200,000 customers. Attackers had accessed some T-Mobile employee email accounts containing customer proprietary network information (CPNI), including names, addresses, phone numbers, account numbers, rate plans, and features. The breach was detected on February 19 2020. No Social Security numbers, passwords, or financial data were exposed. This is a distinct and smaller incident from T-Mobile&amp;rsquo;s major breaches: the 2021 Binns breach (50M+ records via CVSS-scored API/brute force) and the 2023 API breach (37M records, tracked in DB as 2023-01_t-mobile-api). T-Mobile notified affected customers and the FCC.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.vice.com/en/article/t-mobile-discloses-data-breach/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2020-02-19</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2020-03-05</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2020-03-05</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>CWE-285: Improper Authorisation (malicious actors gained access to T-Mobile employee email accounts, which contained customer information)</breach:initialAttackVector></item><item><title>Marriott International 2020 Breach — 5.2 Million Guests via Employee Credentials</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2020-01_marriott-employee-credentials-5-2m/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2020-01_marriott-employee-credentials-5-2m/</guid><description>In March 2020, Marriott International disclosed a second data breach (separate from the 2018 Starwood breach affecting 383 million guests) in which an attacker used the login credentials of two employees at a franchise property to access a Marriott guest services application. The breach occurred at …</description><content:encoded>In March 2020, Marriott International disclosed a second data breach (separate from the 2018 Starwood breach affecting 383 million guests) in which an attacker used the login credentials of two employees at a franchise property to access a Marriott guest services application. The breach occurred at some point before late January 2020 and was discovered on 31 January 2020 when Marriott was alerted to the unexpected data access. The attacker had access to the application from approximately January to late January 2020. Approximately 5.2 million guest accounts were accessed. Exposed data included names, addresses, email addresses, phone numbers, loyalty account numbers and points balances, birth dates, gender, communication preferences, company affiliations, room preferences, and language preferences. Encrypted payment card information and passwords were not compromised. Marriott contacted all affected guests and notified regulators worldwide. The UK ICO was notified and investigated (Marriott had ongoing engagement with the ICO following the larger 2018 breach). Marriott offered free identity monitoring services to affected guests. The breach raised questions about multi-factor authentication for employee access to sensitive guest data systems and the ability to detect anomalous access patterns — particularly when access was through legitimate employee credentials.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://news.marriott.com/news/2020/03/31/marriott-international-notifies-guests-of-property-system-incident</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2020-01-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2020-03-31</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2020-03-31</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>An attacker used the login credentials of two Marriott employees at a franchise property to access a Marriott application used to provide services to guests; the attacker accessed guest data through the legitimate employee login for approximately two months before detection</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Marriott guest services application</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>T-Mobile 2019 Prepaid Customer Breach (1.26M Accounts)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2019-11_tmobile-prepaid-customers/</link><pubDate>Fri, 01 Nov 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2019-11_tmobile-prepaid-customers/</guid><description>In November 2019, T-Mobile&amp;#39;s cybersecurity team identified and shut down unauthorized access to systems containing prepaid customer account information. Approximately 1.26 million prepaid customers were affected — less than 1.5% of T-Mobile&amp;#39;s total customer base at the time. Exposed data included …</description><content:encoded>In November 2019, T-Mobile&amp;rsquo;s cybersecurity team identified and shut down unauthorized access to systems containing prepaid customer account information. Approximately 1.26 million prepaid customers were affected — less than 1.5% of T-Mobile&amp;rsquo;s total customer base at the time. Exposed data included names, billing addresses, phone numbers, account numbers, rate plans, and features. No Social Security numbers, passwords, or financial information were confirmed exposed. T-Mobile notified affected customers and reset PINs. This breach is distinct from the far larger August 2021 breach attributed to John Binns affecting 54 million records, and the 2023 API breach affecting 37 million accounts. T-Mobile has experienced multiple separate breach incidents across 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/t-mobile-discloses-data-breach-impacting-prepaid-customers/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2019-11-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2019-11-22</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2019-11-22</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Unauthorized access to T-Mobile systems containing prepaid customer data; specific access vector not disclosed publicly; distinct from the 2021 John Binns breach affecting 54M records</breach:initialAttackVector></item><item><title>Canva Data Breach (137M Users, GnosticPlayers)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2019-05_canva-gnosticplayers-137m/</link><pubDate>Fri, 24 May 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2019-05_canva-gnosticplayers-137m/</guid><description>On May 24, 2019, Canva — the Australian graphic design SaaS platform — suffered a data breach in which threat actor GnosticPlayers exfiltrated approximately 137 million user records. Canva was notified by Troy Hunt (HaveIBeenPwned) after the actor attempted to sell the data on underground markets, …</description><content:encoded>On May 24, 2019, Canva — the Australian graphic design SaaS platform — suffered a data breach in which threat actor GnosticPlayers exfiltrated approximately 137 million user records. Canva was notified by Troy Hunt (HaveIBeenPwned) after the actor attempted to sell the data on underground markets, and notified users the same day. GnosticPlayers was a prolific 2019 breach actor responsible for stealing over 1 billion records across 8+ companies in early 2019 (including data later comprising Collection #1, Evite, GameSalad, Youthmanual, etc.). Exposed data included usernames, real names, email addresses, country of origin, bcrypt-hashed passwords (for approximately 61 million accounts), and partial payment information. Users who authenticated via Google OAuth had Google token data exposed. Canva forced password resets and invalidated OAuth tokens for affected accounts. While bcrypt password hashes are computationally expensive to crack (significantly more secure than MD5/SHA1), the exposure of 137M email/username combinations created substantial credential stuffing risk. The breach was one of the largest affecting an Australian tech company and prompted increased scrutiny of Canva&amp;rsquo;s security practices as the company was preparing for an IPO.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://support.canva.com/account-settings/privacy-and-security/canva-security-incident/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2019-05-24</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2019-05-24</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2019-05-24</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Unauthorized database access by threat actor GnosticPlayers; attacker claimed to have exploited a vulnerability in Canva's systems (exact vector not publicly confirmed by Canva); affected database contained user account records including bcrypt-hashed passwords</breach:initialAttackVector></item><item><title>Boost Mobile Credential Stuffing Attack (Sprint Subsidiary)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2019-05_boost-mobile-credential-stuffing/</link><pubDate>Thu, 14 Mar 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2019-05_boost-mobile-credential-stuffing/</guid><description>On March 14, 2019, unauthorized parties used credential stuffing techniques — using phone numbers as usernames combined with account PINs — to access an unknown number of Boost Mobile customer accounts. Boost Mobile (a prepaid wireless brand operated as a Sprint subsidiary) notified affected …</description><content:encoded>On March 14, 2019, unauthorized parties used credential stuffing techniques — using phone numbers as usernames combined with account PINs — to access an unknown number of Boost Mobile customer accounts. Boost Mobile (a prepaid wireless brand operated as a Sprint subsidiary) notified affected customers approximately two months after detecting the breach. Exposed data included phone numbers, account PINs, customer names, billing addresses, and account numbers. The two-month notification delay drew criticism from privacy advocates. Boost Mobile reset affected account PINs. This was one of multiple 2019 telecom account breach incidents, alongside a separate Sprint customer data exposure via Samsung&amp;rsquo;s website the same year. Note: Sprint/Boost was subsequently acquired by T-Mobile in 2020.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://techcrunch.com/2019/05/13/boost-mobile-hackers-accounts/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2019-03-14</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2019-05-13</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2019-05-13</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Credential stuffing / account takeover — unauthorized parties used lists of phone number and PIN combinations (likely from prior breaches) to access Boost Mobile customer accounts through the customer portal</breach:initialAttackVector></item><item><title>Dunkin Donuts Credential Stuffing Attack — 325,000 DD Perks Accounts</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2018-10_dunkin-donuts-credential-stuffing/</link><pubDate>Wed, 31 Oct 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2018-10_dunkin-donuts-credential-stuffing/</guid><description>In late October 2018, Dunkin Donuts — one of the world&amp;#39;s largest coffee and baked goods chains — suffered a credential stuffing attack against its DD Perks loyalty rewards program. The attack was discovered on 31 October 2018 when third-party security firm Dunkin contracted detected unusual login …</description><content:encoded>In late October 2018, Dunkin Donuts — one of the world&amp;rsquo;s largest coffee and baked goods chains — suffered a credential stuffing attack against its DD Perks loyalty rewards program. The attack was discovered on 31 October 2018 when third-party security firm Dunkin contracted detected unusual login activity. Approximately 325,000 DD Perks accounts were accessed. The DD Perks accounts contained loyalty points (DD Perks Stars), personal information (names, email addresses, 10-digit DD Perks account numbers), and associated QR codes that could be used at stores as payment. The stolen account credentials were being sold on underground forums. Dunkin notified affected customers in November 2018 and recommended password resets. The New York Attorney General subsequently opened an investigation and in 2020 fined Dunkin $650,000 for failing to adequately notify customers and implement security measures — finding that Dunkin was slow to notify customers and failed to take timely action to prevent further attacks. Dunkin suffered a second credential stuffing attack in January 2019 using the same technique. The dual attacks illustrated the effectiveness of credential stuffing against loyalty programs, where stolen accounts can be monetised by redeeming points for free products or reselling accounts.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://oag.ca.gov/ecrime/databreach/reports/sb24-371</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2018-10-31</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2018-11-09</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2018-11-09</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Cybercriminals used credential stuffing — testing large volumes of username/password combinations stolen from other data breaches — against Dunkin' Donuts's DD Perks rewards program; the attack targeted the mobile app login and successfully authenticated using previously compromised credentials from unrelated breaches</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Dunkin Donuts DD Perks loyalty program</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>Timehop Social Memory App Breach — 21 Million Users, Access Tokens</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2018-07_timehop-21m-social-tokens/</link><pubDate>Wed, 04 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2018-07_timehop-21m-social-tokens/</guid><description>On 4 July 2018 (US Independence Day), an attacker used a compromised cloud environment credential — which lacked multi-factor authentication — to access Timehop&amp;#39;s production cloud environment. Timehop is an app that shows users their &amp;#39;memories&amp;#39; from social media posts from the same date in previous …</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[On 4 July 2018 (US Independence Day), an attacker used a compromised cloud environment credential — which lacked multi-factor authentication — to access Timehop&rsquo;s production cloud environment. Timehop is an app that shows users their &lsquo;memories&rsquo; from social media posts from the same date in previous years. The attacker accessed Timehop&rsquo;s user database and social network API access tokens. The breach affected approximately 21 million users. Exposed data included names, email addresses, phone numbers (for 4.7 million users), dates of birth, and genders. More critically, the attacker also obtained social network OAuth tokens that allowed access to users&rsquo; social media data — including access tokens for Facebook (of approximately 19 million users), Instagram (approximately 16 million users), and Twitter. Timehop immediately deactivated all compromised social network tokens, requiring users to re-authenticate all connected social accounts. The breach disclosed on 8 July 2018 was notable for the exposure of social OAuth tokens — which are effectively keys to users&rsquo; social media archives and could be used to read private messages, post content, or access historical social media data. Timehop had not implemented MFA on its cloud environment administrator account, which was identified as the root cause. The company subsequently implemented MFA on all cloud environment access.]]></content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.timehop.com/securityincident</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2018-07-04</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2018-07-08</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2018-07-08</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>An attacker used a compromised cloud environment credential (lacking multi-factor authentication) to access Timehop's production cloud environment; from there, the attacker accessed Timehop's production database and social network access tokens</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Timehop cloud production environment / user database</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>UnityPoint Health Phishing Attack — 1.4 Million Patient Records</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2018-03_unitypoint-health-bec-1-4m/</link><pubDate>Wed, 14 Mar 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2018-03_unitypoint-health-bec-1-4m/</guid><description>In March and May 2018, UnityPoint Health — a major Iowa-based health system operating approximately 32 hospitals and 280 clinics in Iowa, Illinois, and Wisconsin — suffered two related business email compromise (BEC) phishing attacks that compromised employee email accounts. The first attack ran …</description><content:encoded>In March and May 2018, UnityPoint Health — a major Iowa-based health system operating approximately 32 hospitals and 280 clinics in Iowa, Illinois, and Wisconsin — suffered two related business email compromise (BEC) phishing attacks that compromised employee email accounts. The first attack ran from 14 March to 3 April 2018; the second occurred in May 2018. The attacker used emails impersonating a UnityPoint Health executive to trick employees into entering credentials on a phishing site. Approximately 1.4 million patients were potentially affected as the compromised email accounts had access to or contained patient protected health information. Exposed data included names, dates of birth, medical record numbers, treatment information, health insurance details, and for some patients, Social Security numbers. UnityPoint also suffered separate wire fraud losses from the BEC component of the attack. The health system disclosed the breach on 31 July 2018. HHS OCR opened a HIPAA investigation. A class-action lawsuit was filed. A second phishing attack against UnityPoint in 2018 was separately discovered. The dual incidents made UnityPoint one of the most severely phishing-affected health systems of 2018. Business email compromise targeting healthcare executives is particularly dangerous because compromised executive emails often have access to financial authorisation and patient data systems simultaneously.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach_report.jsf</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2018-03-14</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2018-07-31</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2018-07-31</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Business email compromise (BEC) phishing — a sophisticated email fraud campaign impersonating a UnityPoint Health executive directed employees to click a link and enter credentials, compromising multiple employee email accounts; the attacker used compromised email accounts to access patient data and attempt additional payroll and wire fraud</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>UnityPoint Health employee email / patient data systems</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>Collection #1 — 773M Email Credential Aggregation (Largest Credential Dump)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2019-01_collection1-773m-credential-dump/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2019-01_collection1-773m-credential-dump/</guid><description>On January 17, 2019, Troy Hunt (creator of HaveIBeenPwned) disclosed &amp;#39;Collection #1&amp;#39; — an 87GB aggregated credential dump that had appeared on MEGA cloud storage and hacking forums. It contained 772,904,991 unique email addresses and approximately 21 million unique passwords from approximately …</description><content:encoded>On January 17, 2019, Troy Hunt (creator of HaveIBeenPwned) disclosed &amp;lsquo;Collection #1&amp;rsquo; — an 87GB aggregated credential dump that had appeared on MEGA cloud storage and hacking forums. It contained 772,904,991 unique email addresses and approximately 21 million unique passwords from approximately 2,000+ previously breached websites. This was not a single breach but a mega-aggregation of prior breach data, compiled specifically for high-scale credential stuffing attacks. The sheer size made it the largest credential dataset discovered at the time. HaveIBeenPwned added all 773 million email addresses to its breach notification service, and Troy Hunt&amp;rsquo;s disclosure post became one of the most-read cybersecurity articles of 2019. Collection #1 was later revealed to be just the first in a series — Collections #2 through #5 totaling an additional 845GB were also circulating, meaning the true total compiled credential dataset exceeded 2.2 billion unique email/password pairs.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.troyhunt.com/the-773-million-record-collection-1-data-reach/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2018-01-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2019-01-17</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:initialAttackVector>Compilation of data from 2,000+ previously breached databases, aggregated into a single 87GB credential collection and posted on MEGA cloud storage and hacking forums, designed for use in credential stuffing attacks at scale</breach:initialAttackVector></item><item><title>UK Parliament Email Brute-Force Attack (~90 Accounts Compromised)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2017-06_uk-parliament-owa-brute-force/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Jun 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2017-06_uk-parliament-owa-brute-force/</guid><description>On June 23–24, 2017, an unknown attacker conducted a sustained brute-force attack against the UK Parliament&amp;#39;s Outlook Web Access (OWA) email portal at Westminster. Parliament&amp;#39;s IT team detected the attack and took the remote email access system offline as a precaution within approximately 12 hours, …</description><content:encoded>On June 23–24, 2017, an unknown attacker conducted a sustained brute-force attack against the UK Parliament&amp;rsquo;s Outlook Web Access (OWA) email portal at Westminster. Parliament&amp;rsquo;s IT team detected the attack and took the remote email access system offline as a precaution within approximately 12 hours, impacting around 9,000 parliamentary email users. Approximately 90 accounts were confirmed compromised — those belonging to MPs and staff who had used weak passwords without multi-factor authentication on remote access. The UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) investigated. Formal attribution was not publicly declared, though UK intelligence sources widely reported attribution to a foreign state actor, with Iran&amp;rsquo;s IRGC-affiliated Charming Kitten (APT35) as the primary suspect. The incident came just weeks after WannaCry had disrupted the NHS (May 2017), and prompted the UK Parliament to mandate multi-factor authentication for all remote email access. The relatively unsophisticated attack vector (brute-force against OWA without MFA) underscored how basic security hygiene failures in high-profile institutions create disproportionate vulnerabilities.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-40395573</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2017-06-23</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2017-06-24</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2017-06-24</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Sustained brute-force attack against UK Parliament's internet-facing Outlook Web Access (OWA) email portal; attackers targeted accounts where MPs and staff used weak passwords without multi-factor authentication enforced on remote access</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Microsoft Outlook Web Access (OWA)</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>Saks Fifth Avenue / Lord &amp; Taylor FIN7 POS Breach (5M Cards)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2018-04_saks-lord-taylor-fin7-5m-cards/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 May 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2018-04_saks-lord-taylor-fin7-5m-cards/</guid><description>Between approximately May 2017 and March 2018 (approximately 10 months), the FIN7 cybercriminal organization&amp;#39;s Joker&amp;#39;s Stash carding marketplace operators deployed POS malware across the entirety of Lord &amp;amp; Taylor and 83 Saks Fifth Avenue stores in North America. On March 28–April 2, 2018, JokerStash …</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[Between approximately May 2017 and March 2018 (approximately 10 months), the FIN7 cybercriminal organization&rsquo;s Joker&rsquo;s Stash carding marketplace operators deployed POS malware across the entirety of Lord &amp; Taylor and 83 Saks Fifth Avenue stores in North America. On March 28–April 2, 2018, JokerStash announced a batch of 5 million stolen cards (dubbed &lsquo;BIGBADABOOM-2&rsquo;) on underground carding forums, and Hudson&rsquo;s Bay Company (the parent company of Saks and Lord &amp; Taylor) confirmed the breach on April 2, 2018. Initially 125,000 cards were put up for sale as a sample, with the full 5 million to be released in stages. The breach affected only in-store physical purchases — e-commerce transactions were unaffected. Exposed data: payment card numbers, expiration dates, cardholder names, and in some cases CVVs. No SSNs or other personal data were confirmed stolen. The majority of affected cards were from NY and NJ locations. Hudson&rsquo;s Bay offered free identity protection services to affected customers. FIN7 was one of the most prolific financial crime groups of the 2017–2019 era, also responsible for breaching Chipotle, Arby&rsquo;s, and hundreds of other U.S. restaurant and retail chains.]]></content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/04/saks-fifth-avenue-lord-taylor-stores-hacked/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2017-05-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2018-04-02</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2018-04-02</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>FIN7 cybercrime syndicate (affiliated with Joker's Stash carding marketplace) deployed POS malware across all Lord &amp; Taylor stores and 83 Saks Fifth Avenue locations in North America; malware captured payment card Track data from magnetic stripe readers at physical retail locations</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:malware>BOOSTWRITE / POS malware (FIN7)</breach:malware></item><item><title>Forever 21 POS Malware Breach (7-Month Encryption Failure)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2017-11_forever21-pos-malware/</link><pubDate>Mon, 03 Apr 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2017-11_forever21-pos-malware/</guid><description>Between approximately April 3 and November 18, 2017 (~7 months), POS malware infected Forever 21 retail store locations in the United States. Forever 21 issued an initial public notice in November 2017 after receiving a tip from a third party; detailed investigation findings were shared in January …</description><content:encoded>Between approximately April 3 and November 18, 2017 (~7 months), POS malware infected Forever 21 retail store locations in the United States. Forever 21 issued an initial public notice in November 2017 after receiving a tip from a third party; detailed investigation findings were shared in January 2018. The breach was compounded by a significant security failure: Forever 21 had implemented point-to-point encryption (P2PE) for its payment terminals, but the encryption was not operating correctly or had been disabled at some locations — allowing malware to capture payment card data in plaintext. At some locations the malware was active for the full 7 months; at others only days or weeks. Malware both intercepted live transaction data and accessed stored logs of completed transactions on some devices. Exposed data included card numbers, expiration dates, CVVs, and in some cases cardholder names. In-store transactions only; e-commerce was unaffected. Note: Forever 21 suffered a separate, unrelated data breach in 2023 affecting employee data via a ransomware attack — that incident is documented separately in this repository.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/forever-21-suffered-7-month-pos-malware-attack-a-10555</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2017-04-03</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2017-11-14</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2018-01-01</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>POS malware exploiting disabled or non-functioning point-to-point encryption (P2PE) on Forever 21 payment terminals; malware captured plaintext card data at terminals where encryption was not active, and also accessed completed transaction logs stored on POS devices</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:malware>POS malware</breach:malware></item><item><title>Chipotle Mexican Grill POS Malware Breach (Most U.S. Restaurants)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2017-04_chipotle-pos-malware/</link><pubDate>Fri, 24 Mar 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2017-04_chipotle-pos-malware/</guid><description>Between March 24 and April 18, 2017, POS malware infected the majority of approximately 2,250 Chipotle Mexican Grill restaurant locations across 47 U.S. states and Washington D.C., as well as 7 Pizzeria Locale locations. Chipotle issued an initial public statement on April 25, 2017 after its payment …</description><content:encoded>Between March 24 and April 18, 2017, POS malware infected the majority of approximately 2,250 Chipotle Mexican Grill restaurant locations across 47 U.S. states and Washington D.C., as well as 7 Pizzeria Locale locations. Chipotle issued an initial public statement on April 25, 2017 after its payment processor detected unusual activity. A full investigation completed in May 2017 identified that malware had searched for Track data (cardholder name, card number, expiration date, and internal verification code) as it was routed through POS devices. Only cards used in-store during the affected dates were at risk; online orders and gift card transactions were not affected. The breach affected nearly Chipotle&amp;rsquo;s entire U.S. store fleet simultaneously, suggesting the malware may have been introduced through a common system or software update channel. Chipotle had processed over $600 million in card transactions during the affected period. The company worked with law enforcement and leading cybersecurity firms to investigate and remediate.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://ir.chipotle.com/news-releases?item=122402</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2017-03-24</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2017-04-25</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2017-05-26</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>POS malware installed on payment devices at the majority of Chipotle Mexican Grill restaurant locations; malware searched for and captured Track 1 and Track 2 magnetic stripe data as it was routed through POS processing systems</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:malware>POS malware (Track data scraper)</breach:malware></item><item><title>Sonic Drive-In POS Malware Breach (~5M Payment Cards)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2017-09_sonic-drive-in-pos-5m-cards/</link><pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2017-09_sonic-drive-in-pos-5m-cards/</guid><description>In September 2017, security journalist Brian Krebs reported that a large batch of approximately 5 million stolen payment cards linked to Sonic Drive-In locations had appeared on the Joker&amp;#39;s Stash dark web carding marketplace. The cards (nicknamed &amp;#39;Firetigerz&amp;#39;) began appearing on the market around …</description><content:encoded>In September 2017, security journalist Brian Krebs reported that a large batch of approximately 5 million stolen payment cards linked to Sonic Drive-In locations had appeared on the Joker&amp;rsquo;s Stash dark web carding marketplace. The cards (nicknamed &amp;lsquo;Firetigerz&amp;rsquo;) began appearing on the market around September 15–18, 2017. Sonic Drive-In officially confirmed the breach on October 5, 2017, acknowledging that malware had been installed on POS systems and had been copying card data as customers paid. Sonic stated it was working with law enforcement and third-party forensic experts. Exposed data included payment card numbers, expiration dates, and other magnetic stripe data. Sonic offered 24 months of free fraud monitoring services to affected customers. American Airlines Federal Credit Union filed suit seeking $5 million in damages for the cost of reissuing affected cards. Sonic operates approximately 3,500 drive-in locations across the United States, serving approximately 3 million customers daily.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/09/breach-at-sonic-drive-in-may-have-impacted-millions-of-credit-debit-cards/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2017-01-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2017-10-05</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2017-10-05</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>POS malware deployed across Sonic Drive-In restaurant locations; malware copied payment card data at each swipe from magnetic stripe readers and exfiltrated it to attacker infrastructure</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:malware>POS malware</breach:malware></item><item><title>Arby's POS Malware Breach (355K+ Payment Cards)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2017-02_arbys-pos-malware-355k-cards/</link><pubDate>Tue, 25 Oct 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2017-02_arbys-pos-malware-355k-cards/</guid><description>Between approximately October 25, 2016 and January 19, 2017, POS malware infected corporate-owned Arby&amp;#39;s restaurant locations across the United States. Franchise locations were not affected. Arby&amp;#39;s was reportedly notified of the breach by industry partners (payment card networks detecting fraud …</description><content:encoded>Between approximately October 25, 2016 and January 19, 2017, POS malware infected corporate-owned Arby&amp;rsquo;s restaurant locations across the United States. Franchise locations were not affected. Arby&amp;rsquo;s was reportedly notified of the breach by industry partners (payment card networks detecting fraud patterns) in mid-January 2017 but remained silent at the request of the FBI while the investigation continued. The breach was publicly disclosed in February 2017 after Krebs on Security reported on it. PSCU (a credit union service organization) confirmed that over 355,000 cards issued by its member credit unions were compromised, though the total number of affected cards across all financial institutions was higher. Stolen data included Track 1 and Track 2 magnetic stripe data (cardholder names, card numbers, expiration dates, service codes, CVV). Mandiant was engaged to conduct the forensic investigation. Four credit unions and the Michigan Credit Union League filed class-action suits against Arby&amp;rsquo;s.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/02/fast-food-chain-arbys-acknowledges-breach/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2016-10-25</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2017-02-09</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2017-02-09</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>POS malware deployed on corporate-owned Arby's restaurant systems (not franchise locations); malware captured Track 1 and Track 2 magnetic stripe data as it transited infected POS devices</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:malware>POS malware (Track 1/Track 2 scraper)</breach:malware></item><item><title>Sabre SynXis Central Reservations Breach (1.3M Cards, 36K Hotels)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2017-05_sabre-synxis-hospitality-1-3m-cards/</link><pubDate>Wed, 10 Aug 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2017-05_sabre-synxis-hospitality-1-3m-cards/</guid><description>Between approximately August 10, 2016 and March 9, 2017, an attacker used a compromised administrator account in Sabre Corporation&amp;#39;s SynXis Hospitality Solutions central reservations system — a booking platform used by approximately 36,000 hotels worldwide. The attacker traversed the system daily …</description><content:encoded>Between approximately August 10, 2016 and March 9, 2017, an attacker used a compromised administrator account in Sabre Corporation&amp;rsquo;s SynXis Hospitality Solutions central reservations system — a booking platform used by approximately 36,000 hotels worldwide. The attacker traversed the system daily for approximately 7 months, accessing payment pages and exfiltrating data. The breach affected hotels that used SynXis for direct bookings, including Four Seasons, Trump Hotels, Kimpton, Red Lion Hotels, Rosewood Hotels, Hard Rock Hotels, Loews Hotels, and thousands of others. Approximately 1.3 million credit cards were compromised. Exposed data included card numbers, expiration dates, authorization codes, plus guest names, email addresses, phone numbers, and physical addresses for some reservations. Sabre disclosed the breach in its SEC 10-Q filing in May 2017 and notified affected hotel clients. Sabre settled with state attorneys general for $2.4 million. The breach illustrated the risk of centralized reservation systems that aggregate payment data for thousands of hotels — a compromise of the platform affects all downstream hotel clients simultaneously.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/05/breach-at-sabre-corp-s-hospitality-unit/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2016-08-10</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2017-05-02</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2017-06-01</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Attacker compromised an administrator-level account in Sabre's SynXis central reservations system; the admin password was stored in plaintext within the system; the attacker used the admin account to access payment processing pages and exfiltrate card data daily over approximately 7 months</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Sabre SynXis Central Reservations System</breach:vendorProduct><breach:supplyChainClaimed>true</breach:supplyChainClaimed></item><item><title>InterContinental Hotels Group (IHG) POS Breach (1,200 Franchise Locations)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2017-04_ihg-intercontinental-pos-1200-locations/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Aug 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2017-04_ihg-intercontinental-pos-1200-locations/</guid><description>Between approximately August 1 and December 29, 2016, POS malware was deployed at IHG franchise hotel properties across the United States and Puerto Rico. IHG (InterContinental Hotels Group, parent of Holiday Inn, Crowne Plaza, Holiday Inn Express, Staybridge Suites, and other brands) initially …</description><content:encoded>Between approximately August 1 and December 29, 2016, POS malware was deployed at IHG franchise hotel properties across the United States and Puerto Rico. IHG (InterContinental Hotels Group, parent of Holiday Inn, Crowne Plaza, Holiday Inn Express, Staybridge Suites, and other brands) initially disclosed in February 2017 that 12 of its managed properties were affected, then expanded the disclosure to approximately 1,200 franchise locations in April 2017. The malware targeted food and beverage outlet POS systems (restaurants, bars, lounges) at franchise hotels — front desk/check-in systems were NOT affected. Exposed data included cardholder names, card numbers, expiration dates, and internal verification codes from magnetic stripe reads. Notable affected venues included Michael Jordan&amp;rsquo;s Steak House in Chicago and Sky Lounge in Toronto. IHG settled a class-action lawsuit for $1.55 million. The breach highlighted the difficulty of securing franchise hotel environments, where individual franchisees operate their own POS systems but under the IHG brand. Note: IHG suffered a separate cyberattack in September 2022 that disrupted its booking systems and technology — that is a distinct incident.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint-security/intercontinental-hotels-group-breach-checks-in-at-1-200-locations</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2016-08-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2017-02-03</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2017-04-01</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>POS malware deployed on restaurant and bar point-of-sale systems at IHG franchise hotel locations; malware searched for and captured Track 1 and Track 2 payment card data as it transited affected POS servers</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:malware>POS malware (Track data scraper)</breach:malware></item><item><title>Russian GRU DNC / Podesta Email Hack — 2016 US Presidential Election Interference</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2016-03_gru-dnc-podesta-election-hack/</link><pubDate>Sat, 19 Mar 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2016-03_gru-dnc-podesta-election-hack/</guid><description>Beginning in March 2016, Russian military intelligence operatives from GRU Unit 26165 (Fancy Bear/APT28) and Unit 74455 (Sandworm) conducted a comprehensive hacking campaign against the US Democratic Party and Hillary Clinton&amp;#39;s presidential campaign. On 19 March 2016, John Podesta (Clinton&amp;#39;s …</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[Beginning in March 2016, Russian military intelligence operatives from GRU Unit 26165 (Fancy Bear/APT28) and Unit 74455 (Sandworm) conducted a comprehensive hacking campaign against the US Democratic Party and Hillary Clinton&rsquo;s presidential campaign. On 19 March 2016, John Podesta (Clinton&rsquo;s campaign chairman) received a spear-phishing email; a campaign staffer incorrectly labelled it &rsquo;legitimate&rsquo; in the remediation process, and Podesta entered his credentials on the fake Google login page. His Gmail account was compromised and 50,000+ emails were ultimately exfiltrated. The DNC network was separately compromised using malware including X-Agent (keylogger and file browser) and X-Tunnel (encrypted communications). Opposition research documents, internal communications, and thousands of emails were stolen. WikiLeaks received and published the stolen DNC emails in July 2016 and Podesta&rsquo;s emails in October 2016 — strategically timed around the campaign. The hack was attributed to Russian GRU by the US intelligence community in January 2017 (Intelligence Community Assessment). Special Counsel Robert Mueller indicted 12 GRU officers in July 2018. The attack fundamentally altered the 2016 presidential election and led to sweeping reforms in US election security. The operation is detailed extensively in the Mueller Report (Volume I). GRU also hacked state election systems and the Illinois voter registration database.]]></content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2016-03-19</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2016-06-14</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:initialAttackVector>Russian GRU Unit 26165 (Fancy Bear / APT28) sent spear-phishing emails to Democratic National Committee (DNC) staff and John Podesta (Clinton campaign chairman) that harvested their Google account credentials via a fake Google security alert page; access to Podesta's Gmail was obtained after a staffer incorrectly characterised the phishing email as 'legitimate'</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Google Gmail (Podesta) / DNC internal network</breach:vendorProduct><breach:malware>X-Agent, X-Tunnel, Mimikatz, PlugX</breach:malware></item><item><title>Snapchat Employee Payroll Data Theft via CEO Impersonation</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2016-02_snapchat-ceo-fraud-payroll/</link><pubDate>Fri, 26 Feb 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2016-02_snapchat-ceo-fraud-payroll/</guid><description>On 26 February 2016, a Snapchat payroll department employee received an email purportedly from CEO Evan Spiegel requesting payroll information for employees. The employee complied and emailed payroll data for a number of current and former Snapchat employees to the attacker. Snapchat disclosed the …</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[On 26 February 2016, a Snapchat payroll department employee received an email purportedly from CEO Evan Spiegel requesting payroll information for employees. The employee complied and emailed payroll data for a number of current and former Snapchat employees to the attacker. Snapchat disclosed the breach on 28 February 2016 and apologised to affected employees. Exposed data included W-2 earnings information and payroll information for approximately 700 current and former employees, including names, Social Security numbers, wages, and addresses. Snapchat notified all affected employees, offered credit monitoring and identity theft insurance, and contacted the FBI. Snapchat called it a &lsquo;phishing scam&rsquo; and confirmed no user data was affected. The CEO impersonation method — known as &lsquo;spear-phishing executive impersonation&rsquo; or &lsquo;CEO fraud&rsquo; — is a variant of business email compromise where attackers research executive names from public sources (LinkedIn, company websites) and send convincing emails impersonating them to employees with financial or HR access. The FBI&rsquo;s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) had issued warnings about this exact type of attack in January 2015 and February 2016, noting it had cost US businesses approximately $1 billion. Snapchat&rsquo;s breach came weeks after similar CEO fraud incidents at Austria&rsquo;s FACC (€50M loss) and Belgium&rsquo;s Crelan bank (€70M loss).]]></content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/snapchat-employee-payroll-data-stolen-in-phishing-attack/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2016-02-26</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2016-02-28</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2016-02-28</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>An attacker impersonated Snapchat's CEO Evan Spiegel in a phishing email sent to a Snapchat payroll employee, requesting payroll information; the employee complied and sent payroll data for a number of current and former employees to the attacker — a classic CEO fraud / business email compromise (BEC) attack</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Snapchat HR / payroll systems</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>Wendy's POS Malware Breach (1,025 Franchise Locations)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2016-05_wendys-pos-malware-1025-locations/</link><pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2016-05_wendys-pos-malware-1025-locations/</guid><description>Between approximately fall 2015 and spring 2016, POS malware was deployed at Wendy&amp;#39;s franchise restaurant locations in the United States. Wendy&amp;#39;s first disclosed the breach in May 2016 affecting approximately 300 franchise locations, then expanded the disclosure in July 2016 to 1,025 locations after …</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[Between approximately fall 2015 and spring 2016, POS malware was deployed at Wendy&rsquo;s franchise restaurant locations in the United States. Wendy&rsquo;s first disclosed the breach in May 2016 affecting approximately 300 franchise locations, then expanded the disclosure in July 2016 to 1,025 locations after discovering a second distinct malware strain. The breach was initiated via compromised remote-access credentials of a third-party service provider with access to Wendy&rsquo;s franchisee POS systems — a supply chain attack vector similar to the Target 2013 breach. Two separate malware strains were identified: the first affecting ~300 locations, and a second affecting additional corporate-owned locations. Exposed data included cardholder names, card numbers, expiration dates, service codes, and CVV data from magnetic stripe reads. The breach prompted class-action lawsuits and an investigation. Wendy&rsquo;s franchise locations and corporate-owned locations used different POS systems, which contributed to the scope differences in the two disclosure waves.]]></content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/07/1025-wendys-locations-hit-in-card-breach/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2015-10-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2016-05-11</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2016-07-01</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Attackers compromised remote access credentials belonging to a third-party service provider with access to Wendy's franchisee POS systems, then installed POS malware across multiple franchise locations; a second distinct malware strain was also discovered affecting additional locations</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:malware>POS malware (two distinct strains)</breach:malware><breach:supplyChainClaimed>true</breach:supplyChainClaimed></item><item><title>Hyatt Hotels POS Malware Breach (250 Hotels in 50 Countries)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2015-12_hyatt-hotels-pos-malware-250-hotels/</link><pubDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2015-12_hyatt-hotels-pos-malware-250-hotels/</guid><description>Between approximately August 13 and December 8, 2015, POS malware infected payment processing systems at 250 Hyatt-managed hotels across 50 countries, including 100 hotels in 26 U.S. states. Hyatt first disclosed it was investigating a payment card data incident on December 23, 2015, and published …</description><content:encoded>Between approximately August 13 and December 8, 2015, POS malware infected payment processing systems at 250 Hyatt-managed hotels across 50 countries, including 100 hotels in 26 U.S. states. Hyatt first disclosed it was investigating a payment card data incident on December 23, 2015, and published the full list of 250 affected hotels on January 14, 2016. The malware primarily targeted restaurant and food/beverage POS terminals; a smaller percentage of compromised systems were at spas, golf shops, parking facilities, and front desks. Exposed data included cardholder names, card numbers, expiration dates, and internal verification codes from magnetic stripe reads. Hyatt offered free credit monitoring and identity theft protection to affected customers. The company implemented additional security measures including tokenization and end-to-end encryption. Note: Hyatt suffered a separate, second data breach in 2017 affecting payment card systems at 41 hotels in 11 countries, disclosed October 2017 — that incident is a distinct breach.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/01/hyatt-card-breach-hit-250-hotels-in-50-nations/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2015-08-13</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2015-12-23</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2016-01-14</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>POS malware installed on payment processing computers at Hyatt-managed hotels, primarily targeting restaurant and food/beverage outlet POS terminals; malware harvested cardholder names, card numbers, expiration dates, and internal verification codes as data was processed</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:malware>POS malware</breach:malware></item><item><title>IRS Get Transcript Identity Theft Attack — 100,000+ Taxpayer Accounts</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2015-01_irs-get-transcript-100k/</link><pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2015-01_irs-get-transcript-100k/</guid><description>Between January and May 2015, a sophisticated crime ring accessed the IRS&amp;#39;s &amp;#39;Get Transcript&amp;#39; online application — which allowed taxpayers to retrieve prior-year tax returns — and obtained transcripts for approximately 100,000 US taxpayers by successfully answering identity verification questions. …</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[Between January and May 2015, a sophisticated crime ring accessed the IRS&rsquo;s &lsquo;Get Transcript&rsquo; online application — which allowed taxpayers to retrieve prior-year tax returns — and obtained transcripts for approximately 100,000 US taxpayers by successfully answering identity verification questions. The attackers used previously stolen personal information (Social Security numbers, addresses, dates of birth, tax filing status, and more) from other data breaches to authenticate to the IRS system and retrieve tax transcripts. These transcripts were then used to file fraudulent tax returns and claim refunds. The IRS shut down the Get Transcript application on 21 May 2015. The IRS initially estimated 100,000 accounts accessed; subsequent investigation expanded this to approximately 334,000 accounts where thieves were able to access transcripts, and an additional 281,000 failed attempts blocked. The IRS sent letters to all affected taxpayers offering identity protection PINs for future filings. The total fraudulent refund claims associated with the breach were estimated at approximately $50 million. The attack was attributed to a Russian-speaking organised crime ring. IRS Commissioner John Koskinen testified before Congress. The breach illustrated the severe downstream risk of credential stuffing when personal data from other breaches is aggregated and used to defeat &lsquo;knowledge-based authentication&rsquo; questions.]]></content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-statement-on-the-get-transcript-application</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2015-01-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2015-05-26</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2015-06-01</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Sophisticated crime ring (attributed to Russian-speaking criminal syndicate) used previously stolen personal data (Social Security numbers, dates of birth, addresses, filing status) obtained from external sources to pass the IRS Get Transcript application's authentication questions and access prior-year tax returns for use in fraudulent refund claims</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>IRS Get Transcript online application</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>Kmart / Sears Holdings POS Malware Breach — Payment Card Data</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2014-09_kmart-sears-holdings-pos-malware/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Sep 2014 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2014-09_kmart-sears-holdings-pos-malware/</guid><description>On October 10, 2014, Sears Holdings announced that Kmart stores had been the victim of a data breach involving malware installed on point-of-sale systems. The company stated that the breach had been active for approximately one month beginning in early September 2014 before being discovered by its …</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[On October 10, 2014, Sears Holdings announced that Kmart stores had been the victim of a data breach involving malware installed on point-of-sale systems. The company stated that the breach had been active for approximately one month beginning in early September 2014 before being discovered by its IT security team. Debit and credit card numbers were stolen; however, Sears Holdings stated that no personal information (names, addresses, Social Security numbers), no PIN data, and no EMV chip card data was believed to have been compromised. The company did not disclose the number of affected cards, stating only that Kmart had &lsquo;about 1,200 stores.&rsquo; Security researchers at the time noted the stolen card data subsequently appeared on underground card-selling forums. Sears Holdings&rsquo; IT team detected the breach on October 9, 2014 and moved quickly to contain it by removing the malware from POS systems, bringing in an external forensic firm. The Kmart breach occurred during a wave of large US retail POS malware attacks in 2013-2014 that also struck Target, Home Depot, and other major retailers, all taking advantage of the US&rsquo;s continued reliance on magnetic stripe cards rather than EMV chip cards. The US EMV liability shift for POS terminals took effect in October 2015.]]></content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/10/kmart-stores-hacked/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2014-09-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2014-10-10</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2014-10-10</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Point-of-sale (POS) malware installed on Kmart store payment terminals; the malware was undetected by Kmart's and Sears Holdings' antivirus systems for approximately one month before discovery; the precise initial intrusion vector (how malware was installed on the POS systems) was not disclosed</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>Kmart (Sears Holdings Corporation)</breach:vendorProduct><breach:malware>POS RAM-scraping malware (specific variant not publicly named)</breach:malware></item><item><title>P.F. Chang's POS Malware Breach — 2 Million Payment Cards (FIN6)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2013-09_pf-changs-pos-malware-2m-cards/</link><pubDate>Sun, 01 Sep 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2013-09_pf-changs-pos-malware-2m-cards/</guid><description>P.F. Chang&amp;#39;s China Bistro, a national casual dining restaurant chain, confirmed in June 2014 that it had suffered a payment card breach after KrebsOnSecurity reported that a large batch of stolen cards — dubbed &amp;#39;Eataly&amp;#39; by underground card shops — was traced back to P.F. Chang&amp;#39;s locations. The …</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[P.F. Chang&rsquo;s China Bistro, a national casual dining restaurant chain, confirmed in June 2014 that it had suffered a payment card breach after KrebsOnSecurity reported that a large batch of stolen cards — dubbed &lsquo;Eataly&rsquo; by underground card shops — was traced back to P.F. Chang&rsquo;s locations. The breach involved POS malware installed on restaurant systems that scraped payment card track data from memory during transactions. The malware was active from approximately September 2013 through June 2014, affecting approximately 33 P.F. Chang&rsquo;s restaurant locations. An estimated 2 million payment cards were compromised. After discovering the breach, P.F. Chang&rsquo;s switched to manual card imprinting at all US restaurant locations while it cleaned and rebuilt its POS infrastructure — a highly visible response that drew media attention. The company worked with the Secret Service and engaged security firm Mandiant for forensic investigation. The breach was attributed to FIN6, a financially motivated threat actor known for targeting retail and hospitality POS systems. P.F. Chang&rsquo;s settled class-action lawsuits. The incident highlighted the restaurant sector&rsquo;s particular vulnerability to POS malware, as restaurants frequently process high volumes of payment cards with systems that may lag in patching and network segmentation compared to large retailers.]]></content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/06/p-f-changs-confirms-data-breach/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2013-09-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2014-06-10</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2014-06-12</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>POS malware — attackers compromised P.F. Chang's corporate network and installed RAM-scraping malware on point-of-sale systems at restaurant locations; the specific initial network intrusion vector was not fully disclosed</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:malware>POS RAM-scraping malware</breach:malware></item><item><title>P.F. Chang's POS Malware Breach (2M Cards, FIN6)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2013-09_pf-changs-pos-malware/</link><pubDate>Sun, 01 Sep 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2013-09_pf-changs-pos-malware/</guid><description>P.F. Chang&amp;#39;s China Bistro, a US casual dining restaurant chain, confirmed in June 2014 that its payment systems had been compromised by POS malware for approximately 9 months (September 2013 to June 2014). The breach was discovered when batches of stolen P.F. Chang&amp;#39;s customer credit and debit card …</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[P.F. Chang&rsquo;s China Bistro, a US casual dining restaurant chain, confirmed in June 2014 that its payment systems had been compromised by POS malware for approximately 9 months (September 2013 to June 2014). The breach was discovered when batches of stolen P.F. Chang&rsquo;s customer credit and debit card data began appearing for sale on underground carding forums in early June 2014 — the same Rescator carding marketplace that sold Target and Home Depot breach data. Approximately 2 million payment cards from 33 P.F. Chang&rsquo;s locations across the United States were compromised. The attack was attributed to the FIN6 cybercrime group. Upon discovering the breach, P.F. Chang&rsquo;s switched to manual card imprinting at its restaurants — an inconvenient but effective stopgap measure. Exposed data included payment card numbers, expiration dates, and cardholder names from magnetic stripe reads. P.F. Chang&rsquo;s engaged the US Secret Service and multiple cybersecurity firms. The breach was part of a broader wave of restaurant and retail POS malware attacks in 2013–2014 (Target, Home Depot, Neiman Marcus, Michaels, Chili&rsquo;s parent Brinker International, etc.).]]></content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/06/p-f-changs-confirms-year-long-data-breach/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2013-09-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2014-06-13</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2014-06-13</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>FIN6 cybercrime group deployed POS malware on P.F. Chang's restaurant payment systems; malware captured Track 1 and Track 2 magnetic stripe data from in-store transactions over approximately 9 months</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:malware>POS malware (FIN6)</breach:malware></item><item><title>Michaels Stores POS Malware Breach — 2.6 Million Payment Cards</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2013-01_michaels-stores-pos-malware-26m-cards/</link><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2013-01_michaels-stores-pos-malware-26m-cards/</guid><description>Michaels Stores, the large arts and crafts retail chain, disclosed in January 2014 that it was investigating a potential data security breach involving payment cards used at its stores. The investigation ultimately revealed that between May 8, 2013 and January 27, 2014, POS malware was active on …</description><content:encoded>Michaels Stores, the large arts and crafts retail chain, disclosed in January 2014 that it was investigating a potential data security breach involving payment cards used at its stores. The investigation ultimately revealed that between May 8, 2013 and January 27, 2014, POS malware was active on checkout systems at approximately 877 Michaels store locations across the United States — the vast majority of its store base. Additionally, 54 Aaron Brothers stores (a Michaels subsidiary) were affected between June 26 and September 27, 2013. Approximately 2.6 million payment cards were exposed at Michaels stores, and approximately 400,000 at Aaron Brothers. The malware was specifically designed to scrape payment card track data from RAM during the transaction authorization process, capturing the full magnetic stripe data needed to produce counterfeit cards. Michaels hired security firm Kroll to conduct forensic investigation. The breach occurred contemporaneously with the Target breach (disclosed December 2013) and Neiman Marcus breach, forming a cluster of major POS malware incidents that drew congressional attention and accelerated industry migration to EMV chip card technology in the US. Michaels ultimately paid $125,000 to settle an investigation by the Connecticut Attorney General and contributed to multi-state settlements. The breach is associated with the broader wave of POS malware activity attributed to Eastern European cybercrime groups during 2013-2014.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/04/michaels-stores-breach-affects-3-million-cards/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2013-05-08</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2014-01-25</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2014-04-17</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>POS malware — attackers installed RAM-scraping malware on point-of-sale terminals at Michaels Stores and Aaron Brothers (subsidiary) retail locations, capturing full payment card track data as cards were swiped at checkout</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:malware>POS RAM-scraping malware</breach:malware></item><item><title>Michaels Stores POS Malware Breach (2.6M Cards, Aaron Brothers)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2013-01_michaels-stores-pos-malware/</link><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2013-01_michaels-stores-pos-malware/</guid><description>Michaels Stores, the US arts and crafts retail chain, confirmed in April 2014 that a data breach between May 8, 2013 and January 27, 2014 (approximately 9 months) had compromised approximately 2.6 million credit and debit card accounts from 877 Michaels stores and 54 Aaron Brothers stores (a …</description><content:encoded>Michaels Stores, the US arts and crafts retail chain, confirmed in April 2014 that a data breach between May 8, 2013 and January 27, 2014 (approximately 9 months) had compromised approximately 2.6 million credit and debit card accounts from 877 Michaels stores and 54 Aaron Brothers stores (a Michaels subsidiary) across the United States. Michaels first publicly acknowledged a potential breach on January 26, 2014, shortly after reporting of the Target and Neiman Marcus breaches prompted wider scrutiny of retail security. Cards used at affected stores between May 2013 and January 2014 were at risk. Exposed data included payment card numbers, expiration dates, and CVV data. Michaels engaged Kroll and RSA Security for the investigation. The company offered customers 12 months of free identity protection services. This was Michaels&amp;rsquo; second known payment card breach — a previous incident in 2010–2011 involved compromised PIN pad devices at ~90 stores. The Aaron Brothers subsidiary operated as a custom framing business within and adjacent to Michaels stores.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/04/michaels-breach-exposes-2-6m-payment-cards/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2013-05-08</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2014-01-26</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2014-04-17</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>POS malware deployed on payment systems at Michaels arts and crafts stores and Aaron Brothers stores; initial access likely via compromised third-party vendor credentials; malware captured Track 1 and Track 2 magnetic stripe data</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:malware>POS malware (Track data scraper)</breach:malware></item><item><title>Schnucks Markets POS Malware Breach — 2.4 Million Cards</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2012-12_schnucks-markets-pos-malware-24m-cards/</link><pubDate>Sat, 01 Dec 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2012-12_schnucks-markets-pos-malware-24m-cards/</guid><description>Schnucks, a regional Midwestern grocery chain headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, with approximately 100 store locations, disclosed in March 2013 that it had suffered a payment card breach at its stores. The breach involved POS malware that scraped payment card track data from checkout terminals. …</description><content:encoded>Schnucks, a regional Midwestern grocery chain headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, with approximately 100 store locations, disclosed in March 2013 that it had suffered a payment card breach at its stores. The breach involved POS malware that scraped payment card track data from checkout terminals. The malware operated from approximately December 2012 through March 29, 2013 (when it was removed), affecting approximately 69 Schnucks store locations. Approximately 2.4 million unique payment card numbers were exposed. Schnucks became aware of potential fraudulent activity when card-issuing banks began noticing a pattern of fraud on cards that had all been recently used at Schnucks locations. The company engaged Mandiant for forensic investigation. Schnucks faced significant customer backlash and class-action lawsuits, particularly because the company continued operating stores and accepting card payments for several weeks after the breach was discovered internally before making a public disclosure. The company ultimately settled class actions. The Schnucks breach was part of the early wave of sophisticated POS malware attacks on grocery and supermarket chains that would intensify through 2013-2014. It demonstrated that POS malware was not limited to large national retailers but could successfully target regional grocery chains, and that attackers could maintain persistent access for months before detection.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/05/schnucks-breach-lasted-4-months-affected-2-4-million-cards/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2012-12-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2013-03-30</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2013-03-30</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>POS malware — attackers installed RAM-scraping malware on Schnucks' point-of-sale systems at multiple grocery store locations, capturing payment card track data during checkout transactions</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:malware>POS RAM-scraping malware</breach:malware></item><item><title>Barnes &amp; Noble PIN Pad Skimmer Attack (63 Stores, FBI-Delayed Disclosure)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2012-09_barnes-noble-pos-skimmers/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Aug 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2012-09_barnes-noble-pos-skimmers/</guid><description>Barnes &amp;amp; Noble, the US bookseller, disclosed in October 2012 that PIN pad payment terminals at 63 retail stores across 9 states had been physically tampered with — skimming devices had been installed to capture both magnetic stripe data and PINs from payment cards. Barnes &amp;amp; Noble discovered the …</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[Barnes &amp; Noble, the US bookseller, disclosed in October 2012 that PIN pad payment terminals at 63 retail stores across 9 states had been physically tampered with — skimming devices had been installed to capture both magnetic stripe data and PINs from payment cards. Barnes &amp; Noble discovered the tampering in early September 2012 and immediately disabled all PIN pad devices at all 700 of its stores, reverting to swipe-only transactions. However, the company delayed public disclosure for approximately 6 weeks at the request of the FBI and Secret Service, who were conducting an ongoing investigation. Barnes &amp; Noble disclosed the breach in late October 2012. The incident was notable for: (1) the scale of coordinated physical device tampering across 63 locations in 9 states; (2) the capture of PIN data enabling ATM cash withdrawals (not just card-present fraud); (3) the FBI-requested notification delay; and (4) Barnes &amp; Noble&rsquo;s proactive step of disabling all PIN pads nationwide despite only 63 confirmed compromised locations. The perpetrators were never publicly identified.]]></content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/10/hackers-tamper-with-point-of-sale-terminal-at-63-barnes-noble-stores/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2012-08-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2012-10-24</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2012-10-24</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Physical tampering — attackers installed hardware skimming devices (including PIN capture overlays) on PIN pad terminals at 63 Barnes &amp; Noble stores across 9 states; tampered terminals captured both the magnetic stripe data and PIN from debit card transactions</breach:initialAttackVector></item><item><title>Barnes &amp; Noble POS PIN Pad Tampering — 63 Stores, Card Skimmers</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2012-09_barnes-noble-pos-skimmers-63-stores/</link><pubDate>Fri, 01 Jun 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2012-09_barnes-noble-pos-skimmers-63-stores/</guid><description>Barnes &amp;amp; Noble disclosed in October 2012 that criminals had tampered with at least one PIN pad terminal at each of 63 of its retail bookstore locations across nine states (California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia). The tampering …</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[Barnes &amp; Noble disclosed in October 2012 that criminals had tampered with at least one PIN pad terminal at each of 63 of its retail bookstore locations across nine states (California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia). The tampering occurred over the summer of 2012, likely beginning around June. The compromised PIN pads captured full magnetic stripe data and customer PINs as cards were swiped at checkout. Barnes &amp; Noble discovered the tampering in September 2012 and immediately disconnected all PIN pad devices at its nearly 700 US stores while it conducted a forensic sweep. However, the company delayed public disclosure until October 24 at the request of the FBI, which was investigating the criminal operation. Barnes &amp; Noble notified customers and worked with card issuers to identify and reissue compromised cards. The attack required physical access to store checkout areas, suggesting either inside knowledge or the ability to access checkout terminals during store hours or after-hours. The case highlighted risks of physical tampering with payment terminals as a complement to purely cyber-based card theft methods — attackers were apparently able to modify or swap devices without detection by store staff. Multiple class-action lawsuits were filed against Barnes &amp; Noble alleging inadequate physical security of payment terminals.]]></content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/10/barnes-noble-pulled-card-swipe-terminals-in-63-stores/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2012-06-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2012-10-24</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2012-10-24</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Physical PIN pad tampering — attackers physically installed hardware skimmers or modified PIN pad devices at Barnes &amp; Noble retail checkout terminals in 63 stores across nine US states; the tampered devices captured payment card magnetic stripe data and PINs</breach:initialAttackVector></item><item><title>eHarmony Password Breach — 1.5 Million Unsalted MD5 Hashes Leaked</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2012-06_eharmony-15m-passwords-leaked/</link><pubDate>Tue, 01 May 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2012-06_eharmony-15m-passwords-leaked/</guid><description>On June 6, 2012, eHarmony confirmed that a subset of its member passwords had been compromised and posted to an online password cracking forum. Approximately 1.5 million password hashes were published; eHarmony used unsalted MD5 hashing, which allowed crackers to rapidly recover a large proportion …</description><content:encoded>On June 6, 2012, eHarmony confirmed that a subset of its member passwords had been compromised and posted to an online password cracking forum. Approximately 1.5 million password hashes were published; eHarmony used unsalted MD5 hashing, which allowed crackers to rapidly recover a large proportion of the plaintext passwords. The disclosure came just days after LinkedIn disclosed a similar breach (117 million unsalted SHA-1 hashes leaked on June 6, 2012), and both incidents occurred during a wave of credential database thefts in mid-2012. eHarmony immediately invalidated passwords for affected accounts and required those users to reset their passwords via email. The company did not disclose the full scope of the breach or how attackers gained access to its database. The eHarmony breach is notable because the site&amp;rsquo;s user base consists of people seeking romantic relationships — making exposed accounts particularly sensitive, as users could face embarrassment, blackmail, or targeted phishing attacks that exploit the knowledge of their use of a dating site. The simultaneous disclosure of the eHarmony and LinkedIn breaches in June 2012, combined with the Last.fm breach disclosed the same week, catalyzed industry-wide discussion about password storage practices and accelerated adoption of bcrypt, scrypt, and PBKDF2 as replacements for MD5 and SHA-1 for password hashing.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.zdnet.com/article/eharmony-confirms-password-breach/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2012-05-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2012-06-06</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2012-06-06</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Database breach — attackers gained unauthorized access to eHarmony's member database and extracted hashed passwords; eHarmony stored passwords as unsalted MD5 hashes, making them highly susceptible to rainbow table and brute-force cracking</breach:initialAttackVector></item><item><title>eHarmony Password Hash Breach (1.5M Unsalted MD5 Passwords)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2012-06_eharmony-passwords-unsalted/</link><pubDate>Tue, 01 May 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2012-06_eharmony-passwords-unsalted/</guid><description>eHarmony, the US online dating service, disclosed on June 6, 2012 that a subset of its member passwords had been compromised and posted online. Approximately 1.5 million unsalted MD5 password hashes were published to a Russian hacking forum — the same forum where the contemporaneous LinkedIn 6.5 …</description><content:encoded>eHarmony, the US online dating service, disclosed on June 6, 2012 that a subset of its member passwords had been compromised and posted online. Approximately 1.5 million unsalted MD5 password hashes were published to a Russian hacking forum — the same forum where the contemporaneous LinkedIn 6.5 million password hash dump appeared within the same week (June 5–6, 2012). Unsalted MD5 hashes are trivially cracked using rainbow tables and dictionary attacks; security researchers cracked the majority within hours. eHarmony reset affected member passwords proactively. The coincidental timing with the LinkedIn breach during the same week in June 2012 drew attention to the widespread industry practice of storing passwords as unsalted MD5 hashes — a practice now considered a fundamental security failure. The incident reinforced the industry shift toward properly salted, slow password hashing algorithms (bcrypt, scrypt, Argon2). eHarmony serves tens of millions of members globally.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.cnet.com/tech/services-and-software/eharmony-confirms-it-was-hacked-1-5m-passwords-posted-online/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2012-05-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2012-06-06</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2012-06-06</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Unauthorized access to eHarmony's user database; attackers obtained and published approximately 1.5 million unsalted MD5 password hashes online</breach:initialAttackVector></item><item><title>Last.fm Password Breach — 43 Million Unsalted MD5 Hashes (Discovered 2016)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2012-03_lastfm-43m-passwords-breach/</link><pubDate>Thu, 01 Mar 2012 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2012-03_lastfm-43m-passwords-breach/</guid><description>Last.fm, the music discovery and social listening service (owned by CBS Interactive from 2007), suffered a breach of its user database that occurred around 2012 but was not publicly disclosed until September 2016 when approximately 43.5 million records appeared on LeakedSource, a breach notification …</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[Last.fm, the music discovery and social listening service (owned by CBS Interactive from 2007), suffered a breach of its user database that occurred around 2012 but was not publicly disclosed until September 2016 when approximately 43.5 million records appeared on LeakedSource, a breach notification and data search service. The breach included email addresses, usernames, and passwords stored as unsalted MD5 hashes. The 2012 timeframe aligns with Last.fm&rsquo;s June 2012 public announcement that it was &lsquo;investigating a report that some Last.fm user passwords have been compromised&rsquo; and advising users to change passwords — but at the time the full scale (43 million accounts) was not disclosed or publicly known. The unsalted MD5 storage meant a very high proportion of passwords were crackable. Last.fm notified users in 2016 when the full dataset became known and forced password resets. The breach is part of a cluster of major 2012 credential database thefts — including LinkedIn (117M), Dropbox (68M), MySpace (360M), and eHarmony (1.5M) — that were stolen in 2012 but surfaced on criminal markets during 2016, years later. This pattern demonstrated the long &lsquo;shelf life&rsquo; of stolen credential databases and the delayed nature of breach discovery and disclosure for many incidents from that era.]]></content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.leakedsource.com/blog/lastfm</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2012-03-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2016-09-01</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2016-09-01</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Database breach — attackers obtained Last.fm's user credential database; the passwords were stored as unsalted MD5 hashes, enabling mass cracking; the breach was not discovered publicly until 2016 when the database appeared on underground markets</breach:initialAttackVector></item><item><title>Subway Restaurants POS Malware Breach — 3 Million Cards (Romanian Gang)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2011-12_subway-pos-malware-3m-cards/</link><pubDate>Sat, 01 Jan 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2011-12_subway-pos-malware-3m-cards/</guid><description>A Romanian cybercrime group compromised point-of-sale systems at approximately 150 Subway franchise restaurants across the United States, stealing over 80,000 payment card numbers — though some reports cite figures as high as 3 million cards when aggregating the full scope of the operation. The …</description><content:encoded>A Romanian cybercrime group compromised point-of-sale systems at approximately 150 Subway franchise restaurants across the United States, stealing over 80,000 payment card numbers — though some reports cite figures as high as 3 million cards when aggregating the full scope of the operation. The group, led by Iulian Dolan and including co-conspirators Cezar Butu and Adrian Tiberiu Oprea, gained access to Subway franchise POS systems by exploiting weak RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) credentials that allowed direct remote access to Windows-based POS computers. Once inside, they installed keystroke loggers and memory-scraping malware to harvest payment card data. The operation targeted not just Subway but also approximately 80 other restaurant and retail chains. In 2012, the conspirators were indicted in U.S. federal court; Dolan and Oprea were sentenced to seven and four years in federal prison respectively in 2013. The case was significant for exposing the widespread use of default or weak RDP credentials on franchise POS systems — a vector attackers could exploit at scale by scanning the internet for exposed RDP ports. The case contributed to PCI DSS guidance emphasizing the prohibition of default system passwords and the importance of network segmentation for POS systems.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/02/subway-sandwich-shops-hit-by-serial-skimmers/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2011-01-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2012-02-08</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2012-02-08</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Remote desktop protocol (RDP) intrusion — a Romanian criminal group remotely accessed franchise-owned Subway POS systems using weak or default RDP credentials; many Subway franchise locations ran their POS software on Windows computers with RDP enabled and inadequate passwords</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:malware>POS keylogger/scraping malware</breach:malware></item><item><title>Twitter Admin Panel Brute-Force: Obama, Britney Spears, Fox News Accounts Hijacked</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2009-01_twitter-admin-panel-brute-force/</link><pubDate>Mon, 05 Jan 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2009-01_twitter-admin-panel-brute-force/</guid><description>In January 2009, a hacker gained access to Twitter&amp;#39;s administrative control panel by guessing the password of a Twitter admin account using automated brute force — Twitter had implemented no rate limiting or lockout on admin panel login attempts. Using administrative access, the hacker hijacked …</description><content:encoded>In January 2009, a hacker gained access to Twitter&amp;rsquo;s administrative control panel by guessing the password of a Twitter admin account using automated brute force — Twitter had implemented no rate limiting or lockout on admin panel login attempts. Using administrative access, the hacker hijacked approximately 30 high-profile accounts including then-President-Elect Barack Obama&amp;rsquo;s (@barackobama), Britney Spears, Fox News, and others, posting fake messages. The hacker subsequently explained the attack method to TechCrunch — they had used a simple tool that tried common passwords against the admin panel until one worked. Twitter resolved the compromise and hardened admin access controls. This was the first major social media account takeover incident and foreshadowed the 2020 Twitter Bitcoin scam hack (which also originated from admin tool access, though via social engineering). It highlighted the extreme risk of admin tool accounts with weak password policies and no rate limiting.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/01/05/twitter.hacked/index.html</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2009-01-05</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2009-01-05</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2009-01-05</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Automated brute-force attack against Twitter's administrative control panel using common passwords; Twitter had no account lockout policy or rate limiting on administrative login attempts, allowing unlimited password guesses</breach:initialAttackVector></item><item><title>RBS WorldPay ATM Cashout — First Major Coordinated Global ATM Fraud ($9.4M)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2008-11_rbs-worldpay-atm-cashout-9m/</link><pubDate>Tue, 04 Nov 2008 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2008-11_rbs-worldpay-atm-cashout-9m/</guid><description>RBS WorldPay, the US payment processing division of the Royal Bank of Scotland (distinct from the later Worldpay/FIS entity), suffered a coordinated cyberattack in early November 2008. Attackers compromised RBS WorldPay&amp;#39;s network, broke the encryption on payroll debit card accounts, and raised the …</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[RBS WorldPay, the US payment processing division of the Royal Bank of Scotland (distinct from the later Worldpay/FIS entity), suffered a coordinated cyberattack in early November 2008. Attackers compromised RBS WorldPay&rsquo;s network, broke the encryption on payroll debit card accounts, and raised the withdrawal limits on 44 compromised card accounts from typical amounts to $500,000. On November 8, 2008, in a synchronized operation across at least 280 cities worldwide (US, Russia, Ukraine, Hong Kong, Japan, Canada, and others), a global network of &lsquo;cashers&rsquo; made approximately 9,000 ATM withdrawals from 2,100+ ATMs within a 12-hour window, stealing approximately $9.4 million in total. The speed and global coordination of the cashout — executed simultaneously across dozens of countries before fraud systems could react — established a template for &lsquo;jackpotting&rsquo; and coordinated ATM cashout operations that became increasingly common in subsequent years. The attack exposed data on approximately 1.5 million cardholders. RBS WorldPay disclosed the breach in a December 23, 2008 SEC filing. In November 2009, the US Department of Justice unsealed an indictment charging Estonian national Sergei Tsurikov, Russian national Viktor Pleshchuk, and others with computer fraud and wire fraud. Tsurikov received an 11-year sentence. This incident is distinct from the FIS/Worldpay prepaid card breach of 2010 (already in this repository).]]></content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://krebsonsecurity.com/2009/12/charges-in-rbs-worldpay-9-million-global-heist/</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2008-11-04</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2008-12-23</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2008-12-23</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Eastern European cybercriminals (Sergei Tsurikov et al.) exploited vulnerabilities in RBS WorldPay's payment processing network, broke the encryption protecting payroll debit card account data, raised withdrawal limits on 44 compromised accounts, and cloned cards for distribution to a global network of ATM 'cashers'</breach:initialAttackVector><breach:vendorProduct>RBS WorldPay payment processing network</breach:vendorProduct></item><item><title>ShadowCrew / Operation Firewall: Underground Carding Forum Takedown (1.7M Cards)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2004-10_shadowcrew-operation-firewall/</link><pubDate>Thu, 01 Aug 2002 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/2004-10_shadowcrew-operation-firewall/</guid><description>ShadowCrew was an underground carding forum operating from August 2002 until its takedown on October 26, 2004 in Operation Firewall — a joint US Secret Service operation involving law enforcement agencies in 8 US states and 6 countries. At its peak, ShadowCrew had approximately 4,000 members and was …</description><content:encoded>ShadowCrew was an underground carding forum operating from August 2002 until its takedown on October 26, 2004 in Operation Firewall — a joint US Secret Service operation involving law enforcement agencies in 8 US states and 6 countries. At its peak, ShadowCrew had approximately 4,000 members and was the largest English-language carding forum in existence. The forum facilitated the trafficking of at least 1.7 million stolen credit and debit card numbers, 18 million email accounts containing PII, and over $4 million in direct financial fraud. Members obtained stolen card data through phishing campaigns, physical skimmers on ATMs, SQL injection attacks, and network intrusions. A key member of ShadowCrew&amp;rsquo;s inner circle was Albert Gonzalez, who was arrested in a separate operation in 2003 and subsequently became a paid Secret Service informant, providing critical intelligence that led to Operation Firewall. Gonzalez later orchestrated the TJX and Heartland breaches while supposedly working as an informant. Operation Firewall resulted in 28 arrests across 6 countries and the first-ever use of a network wiretap by US law enforcement (capturing 2TB of evidence). The takedown of ShadowCrew and the simultaneous rise of successor forums (Carders Market, CardersMarket) demonstrated that carding forums were resilient distributed criminal enterprises — decapitating one simply led to fragmentation into many.</content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ShadowCrew</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>2002-08-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2004-10-26</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:initialAttackVector>Centralized underground internet forum enabling buying, selling, and trading of stolen credit card data, identity documents, and malware tools; supplied by members conducting phishing, skimming, malware deployment, and SQL injection attacks against financial institutions and retailers</breach:initialAttackVector></item><item><title>CD Universe Maxus Credit Card Extortion (300K Cards, First Major Breach Extortion)</title><link>https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/1999-12_cd-universe-maxus-extortion/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Dec 1999 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="true">https://breachnotes.vulnes.is/credential-theft/1999-12_cd-universe-maxus-extortion/</guid><description>In December 1999, an attacker known only as &amp;#39;Maxus&amp;#39; (believed to be a ~19-year-old Eastern European) exploited a vulnerability in the payment processing systems of CD Universe, an early online music retailer, and stole approximately 300,000 customer credit card numbers. Maxus sent an anonymous email …</description><content:encoded><![CDATA[In December 1999, an attacker known only as &lsquo;Maxus&rsquo; (believed to be a ~19-year-old Eastern European) exploited a vulnerability in the payment processing systems of CD Universe, an early online music retailer, and stole approximately 300,000 customer credit card numbers. Maxus sent an anonymous email to CD Universe demanding $100,000 in ransom to not publish the stolen cards. CD Universe refused to pay and instead reported the matter to the FBI. In January 2000, Maxus posted approximately 25,000 of the stolen card numbers to a website called &lsquo;Maxus Credit Card Pipeline&rsquo; and offered the remainder online. Maxus was never identified or arrested. This incident was one of the first widely-reported cases of a cybercriminal extorting an online retailer with stolen customer data and refusing to accept &rsquo;no&rsquo; — pioneering the data extortion business model that ransomware groups would systematize two decades later. The breach also highlighted the growing risk of storing unencrypted payment card data in early e-commerce systems.]]></content:encoded><category>credential-theft</category><breach:sourceUrl>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cduniverse.com</breach:sourceUrl><breach:dateOfBreach>1999-12-01</breach:dateOfBreach><breach:dateOfDisclosure>2000-01-10</breach:dateOfDisclosure><breach:dateOfCustomerNotification>2000-01-10</breach:dateOfCustomerNotification><breach:initialAttackVector>Attacker (known only as 'Maxus,' believed to be an Eastern European teenager) exploited a vulnerability in CD Universe's payment processing software to access the customer credit card database</breach:initialAttackVector></item></channel></rss>